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PREFACE 
Bayesian networks, encountered in the study of 
artificial intelligence, are directed acyclic graphs in 
which nodes represent real life events. Arcs in these 
graphs signify the existence of direct causal influences 
·between two such events. The strengths of these causal 
influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. 
Pearl (1986) developed two algorithms used to update 
Bayesian networks in the face of subsequent information. 
These algorithms permit the use of Bayesian networks as 
methods of managing uncertainty in expert systems. Pearl 
applied probabilities in his proposed algorithms. The use 
of linguistic probabilities provides users of systems based 
on such probabilities a more meaningful method of system 
interaction than through the use of probabilities. 
Consequently, this study develops two algorithms similar to 
those proposed by Pearl, however, these e~ploy fuzzy set 
theory rather than probability theory. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Expert Systems 
Expert System structure 
Computer-based models and systems for decision support 
are beginning to play an important role in decision making. 
An ES which is one of the popular computer-based systems for 
decision support, is a computer application that solves 
complicated problems that would otherwise require extensive 
human expertise. ESs have been used to do a wide variety of 
things, such as diagnosing and prescribing treatments for 
certain infectious diseases, configuring new computer 
installations, and many more. 
To do so, an ES simulates the human reasoning process 
by applying specific knowledge and inferences. Internally, 
an· ideal ES has the following characteristics: extensive 
specific knowledge from the domain of interest; application 
of search techniques; support for heuristic analysis; 
capacity to infer new knowledge from existing knowledge; 
symbolic processing; and an ability to explain its own 
reasoning [Rolston, 1988]. 
Heuristic rules are rules of thumb that suggest the 
procedures to be followed when invariant procedural rules 
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are not available. The very presence of heuristics 
contributes greatly to the power and flexibility of ESs and 
distinguishes ESs from more traditional software. ESs use a 
symbolic representation for the relationship between stored 
information in a knowledge base. Performance of inference 
and heuristic search in ESs heavily depends on the 
manipulation of symbols, e.g., strings of characters (i.e., 
"names"). Thus symbolic processing becomes an important 
issue in ESs. 
ES 
Poses User Inference Knowledge 
User > - > <---> 
Problem interface engine Base 
Response 
Figure 1. Structure of an ES 
A structure of an ES is shown in Figure 1 [Holsapple 
and Winston, 1987]. When using an ES, a user interacts with 
the system via its user interface. Then the inference 
engine which is the problem-solving software, actually 
carries out the reasoning needed to solve a problem. In 
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doing so, it uses the knowledge stored in the knowledge base 
(KB). The KB contains a collection of rules, each of which 
captures the knowledge about how to reason in a specific 
problem area addressed by an ES. When the problem is 
solved, the inference engine reports the solution to the 
user with the explanation of its line of reasoning in 
reaching that solution. 
A rule is one of the schemes to represent the 
knowledge, and other schemes include formal logic, frame, 
semantic net, and script. Formal logic, an outgrowth of 
early philosophical considerations, was one of the earliest 
forms of (formal) knowledge representation used in AI, while 
the nonf ormal ones are more flexible and widely used schemes 
for representing knowledge. The knowledge representation 
schemes is discussed below in detail. 
Knowledge Representation Schemes 
A number of knowledge representation schemes for ES 
have been developed that range from nonformal representation 
schemes such as semantic net, frame, script, and production 
system to formal schemes such as a (first-order) predicate 
logic. A production system, the most commonly used scheme, 
uses rules for knowledge representation. 
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Formal Logic 
The (first-order) predicate logic consists of four 
major components: the "alphabets," a "formal language," a 
set of basic statements called "axioms," and a set of 
"inference rules." The "alphabets" consist of "constants," 
"variables," "functions," "predicates," "connectives," 
"quantifiers," and "delimiters" such as parentheses and 
commas. 
A "constant" is used to represent a specific element 
from the domain, where BLUE representing a blue color is an 
example. A "variable" is used to represent a member of a 
set of domain elements without specifying a specific 
element, where "animal" can be a "variable" whose elements 
include "lion" and "tiger." A "function" describes an 
element by identifying it as an unique result of the 
application of a specified mapping between other elements in 
the domain. For example, "father(JOHN)" which could 
represent a unique individual who is a father of JOHN, uses 
"father" as a "function." 
The "predicate" is used to represent relation within 
the domain such that its value is true if the elements in 
the domain are related in the specified way and false if 
they are not. BIGGER(TOM,BOB) which could represent the 
fact "Tom is bigger than Bob," is an example of the 
predicate. The "variable" can be used as the argument of 
"predicate." However, the first-order predicate logic does 
not allow a "function" or "predicate" to be used as the 
argument of the "predicate." 
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The connective is used to combine predicates. There 
are two types of quantifiers, that is, universal quantifier 
and existential quantifier, where the universal quantifier 
is used to assert that a formula consisting of predicates is 
true for all values of the associated variable and the 
existential quantifier is used to assert that there exists 
at least one value such that the associated formula is true. 
The "atomic formulas" are individual predicates 
together with arguments. The "literals" are atomic formulas 
and negated atomic formulas. The "well-formed formulas 
(WFFS)" are defined recursively: literals are WFFS; WFFS 
connected together by the connectives are WFFS; and WFFS 
surrounded by quantifiers are also WFFS (p.211, 
Winston,1984]. 
A "formal language" associated with first-order 
predicate logic is the set of all formulas that can be 
legally constructed from the "alphabets." A set of 
statements, e.g., Feathers(Squigs) and (Feathers(x) -> 
Bird(x)] for all x, are "axioms," where Feathers(Squigs) 
could represent the fact that Squigs has feathers and 
(Feathers(x) ->Bird(x)] could represent a rule, i.e., if· a 
creature has the feathers then a creature is a bird. 
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Semantic Network 
The concept of semantic networks was introduced by Ross 
Quillian [1968]. It focuses on the graphical representation 
of relations between elements in a domain, where its basic 
components are nodes and links. Node represents domain 
element, while the link represents a (binary) relation 
between elements. For example, the facts that a horse is a 
type of a mammal and a tail is a part of a horse can be 
represented by a semantic networks shown in Figure 2 
[Rolston, 1988]: 
TAIL I partof 
HORSE isa ~-> MAMMAL 
Figure 2. An example of 
a semantic network 
Frames 
Minsky [1975] coined the. term "frames" in an attempt to 
represent knowledge in the context of which many ordinary 
events or objects appear. A frame is a collection of 
semantic net nodes and slots that together describe a 
stereotyped object, act, or event, where each slot 
represents a standard property or attribute of the element 
represented by it [Winston,1984]. A frame that provides a 
partial description of the class of objects called CAR is 
shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
AN EXAMPLE OF A FRAME 
Frame: CAR 
Specialization of: LAND VEHICLE 
Model: 
Range: (sedan, convertible, 2-door, station wagon) 
Default: sedan 
Body: steel 
Windows: glass 
Mobility: self-propelled 
Mobility mechanism: has wheels 
Tires: rubber 
Fuel: 
Range: (gasoline, diesel, propane) 
Default: gasoline 
Number of Seats: 
Range: ( 1-9) 
Default: none 
Inheritance is a very important concept in a frame 
system. Any given class of objects can be included in 
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several different frames that represent objects at different 
levels of specification. For example, the class "car" can 
be included in the frames named "land vehicle." The "car" 
frame, for example, inherits the attribute of "mobility 
mechanism: has wheels" from the fact that it is a 
specialization of a "land vehicle" frame. The use of 
inheritance enables the reasoning process to be efficient 
primarily because we can avoid rediscovering old facts in 
new situations. 
Script 
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A script, which is a specialization of the general 
concept of a frame, is a structure that is used to store the 
prototypes of expected sequences of events [Schank and 
Abelson, 1977]. Many different components including entry 
conditions, script results, props, roles, and scenes can be 
used to construct a script. 
The entry conditions represent conditions that must 
exist for the script to be applicable and script results 
represent conditions that will be true after the events in 
the script have occurred. Props represent slots that 
represent objects that are involved in a script and roles 
represent slots that represent agents (e.g., people) that 
perform actions in a script. Scenes represent specific 
sequences of events that make up a script [Rolston, 1988]. 
A script that could represent the process of driving to a 
theater is shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
AN EXAMPLE OF A SCRIPT 
Script: TRIP TO THEATER 
Props: 
car 
keys 
car door 
parking space 
Roles: 
owner 
valet 
Entry Conditions: 
owner and car 
at start point 
Results: 
owner and car 
at theater 
Scene 1: START UP 
* owner finds keys 
* owner unlocks car door 
* owner starts car 
* owner places car in gear 
* owner releases parking brake 
Scene 2: DRIVE 
* owner finds opening in traffic 
* owner enters traffic 
* owner drives to theater 
Scene 3: VALET CONTACT 
* owner stops car 
* owner exits car 
* owner gives keys to valet 
Scene 4: VALET PARKING 
* valet enters car 
* valet finds empty parking space 
* valet enters parking space 
* valet stops car 
* valet sets parking brake 
* valet exits car 
Production Systems 
A production system, the most commonly used scheme in 
ESs, uses rules for the knowledge representation, where a 
production system consists of: a knowledge base; a rule 
base; and an inference mechanism [Newell and Simon, 1972]. 
One of the advantages of a production system consists in 
storing the knowledge in a uniform and modular form. 
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This makes each production rule essentially a separate, 
independent entity that makes adding, deleting, or modifying 
productions rules very easy. On the other hand, a 
production system has a disadvantage in that the 
independence of production rules makes it very difficult to 
force the execution of a specific sequence of events, even 
though a specific sequence may be desirable in a certain 
application. 
Inference 
An inference is the process of deriving a conclusion in 
logic by either induction or deduction. The techniques 
which are used for inference in a number of knowledge 
representation schemes, are to be presented. First, 
inference based on a formal logic will be discussed. One 
obvious strategy to prove a theorem is to search forward 
from the axioms using rules of inference such as "modus 
ponens." "Modus ponens" states that "if P1 is true, and P1 
being true implies that P2 is true, then P2 is true." 
One of the greatest advantages of representation using 
a formal logic is that a syntactic inference is possible and 
is guaranteed to be valid. A syntactic inference is the 
inference performed by applying a set of well-defined rules 
of inference to a set of facts mechanically without a 
complete understanding of the meanings of facts. However, 
there is no guarantee that the syntactic inference will 
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always produce valuable results. 
Another strategy is to prove a theorem by showing that 
the negation of a theorem cannot be TRUE. This strategy is 
called "proof by refutation" or "proof by contradiction." 
It adopts a rule of inference called "resolution." 
"Resolution" states that "if there is an axiom of the form 
E1 V E2 , and there is another axiom of the form -E2 V E3 , 
then E1 V E3 logically follows," where 'V' and ' - ' denote 
"union" and "not," respectively. 
Second, even if the reasoning based on semantic nets is 
generally straightforward, the inferences are not guaranteed 
to be always valid, primarily because it is based on the 
closed world assumption (CWA). Under the open world 
assumption (OWA) a theorem is assumed to be false if and 
only if (iff) it can be proven false, whereas under the CWA 
a theorem is assumed to be false if no proof of a theorem 
exists [Gallaire and Minker, 1978]. 
Third, a frame system has the advantage in that it 
allows us to reason, to some extent, under the condition 
where the information available is incomplete, and it allows 
us to infer facts that are not explicitly observed. This is 
made possible by a .collection of default values, where 
default values are the expectations regarding an object if 
none is explicitly provided. 
However, one of the difficulties with a frame 
representation is the problem of establishing the default 
values for a frame accurately. This occurs primarily 
because there is no exact agreement among any group of 
observers as to the typical characteristics of any object. 
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Fourth, the reasoning on the basis of a script is 
straightforward with two steps, that is, the selection of an 
appropriate script and use of the scenes to inf er the 
existence of unobserved events. However, its reasoning is 
not reliable for predicting future events on the basis of a 
scene. For example, in Table 2, the fact that the valet has 
found a parking space does not necessarily imply that he/she 
will continue to follow the scene and park the car. 
Finally, there are two types of reasoning used in a 
production system: forward reasoning and backward reasoning. 
Forward reasoning (or forward chaining) examines each rule 
in a forward direction, looking first at its premise. When 
a rule's premise is found to match a theorem to be proved, 
the rule is fired and the actions in its conclusion are 
taken. on the other hand, a backward reasoning (or backward 
chaining) looks first at a rule's conclusion, rather than 
its premise. Because the match process can identify many 
matches in a large production system, the process of 
selecting a specific match to be executed, called conflict 
resolutio~, is necessary. 
Dealing With Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is present in many real life problems and 
human experts need to cope with it in decision making. 
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Thus, the ESs which are developed to solve real life 
problems must also be able to reason under uncertainty. The 
uncertainty might be present in the knowledge or in the 
collected data. 
For example, the reasoning under uncertainty in a rule-
based system should provide answers to the following 
questions [Berenji, 1987]: 
1. How should we combine uncertainties in the premises of a 
rule (e.g., A, Bin the Figure 3)? 
2. How should we propagate this uncertainty to the 
conclusion of the rule (e,g., combine with the strength of 
the conclusion, 0.7 in Figure 3)? 
3. If more than one rule results in the same conclusion 
(e.g., rule 1 and rule 2 in Figure 3), how should we combine 
them to get an aggregate measure for supporting (or 
refuting) the conclusion (e.g., conclusion C in Figure 3)? 
In Figure 3, there are two rules resulting in the same 
conclusion c, where rule 1 states that if premises A and B 
are true then C is true, and rule 2 states that if premise D 
is true then C is true. 
Rule 1: A, B 
I I 0.7 
0.3 0.4 
c 
0.8 
D 
Rule 2 
Figure 3. An example of an inference 
diagram in a rule-based 
system 
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The presence of uncertainty in reasoning systems is due 
to a variety of sources: the "reliability" of information, 
the inherent "imprecision" of the representation language in 
which the information is conveyed, the "incompleteness" of 
information, and the "aggregation" or "summarization" of 
information from multiple sources [Bonissone and Decker, 
1986]. To address these problems, AI researchers have 
developed a variety of approaches for reasoning under 
uncertainty. 
The existing approaches are divided into two classes: 
numeric and non-numeric approaches. The numeric approaches 
represent uncertainty as a precise quantity (scalar or 
interval) on a given scale. The typical numeric approaches 
that are currently available are the certainty factor (CF) 
approach, the Bayesian approach, Dempster-Shafer theory 
(DST), fuzzy set theory (FST) and support logic programming 
(SLOP). On the other hand, the non-numeric approaches do. 
not use a quantity as the representation of uncertainty. 
Instead, they are based on the idea of dealing with the 
reasons for believing and disbelieving the specific 
hypothesis(or event). The typical non-numeric approach is 
the theory of endorsement [Cohen; 1983a, 1983b]. 
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There have been a great deal of debates between some AI 
researchers favoring the Bayesian approach and others 
favoring non-Bayesian numerical approaches such as CF 
approach, DST, FST, and SLOP. Their basic lines of 
arguments are as follows: AI researchers favoring the 
Bayesian approach insist that the Bayesian approach is good 
enough to handle the uncertainty, while others favoring non-
Bayesian approaches insist otherwise. 
The non-Bayesian numeric approaches that have drawn a 
greatest deal of attentions are DST and FST. We shall refer 
to the non-Bayesian (numerical) approaches to uncertainty 
management in ESs as uncertain inference systems (UIS'). 
Objectives of the study 
The objective of this study is to develop two 
algorithms for Bayesian networks based on FST. The first 
algorithm is for a tree structure, and the second algorithm 
is for the network. Bayesian (belief) networks are the 
directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent 
propositions (or variables), the arcs signify the existence 
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of direct causal influences between the linked propositions, 
and the strengths of these influences are quantified by 
conditional probabilities [Pearl, 1986a]. 
Pearl [1982; Kim and Pearl, 1983; 1985a; 1986a] showed 
that if a network is singly-connected, the probabilities can 
be updated by a local propagation and the impact of new 
information is imparted to all propositions in time 
proportional to the longest path in the network. A singly-
connected network is a network such that there exists only 
one (undirected) path between any pair of nodes. 
A singly-connected network includes a tree structure in 
which each node has at most one parent node and a network 
structure in which each node is allowed to have multiple 
parent node(s). A local propagation denotes a propagation 
which is performed locally. 
Our proposed algorithms employ the linguistic 
probabilities instead of the probabilities. While Pearl's 
algorithms are such that the belief at the root node is 
quantified by prior probability and the strengths of the 
influences between the linked propositions are quantified by 
conditional probabilities, the proposed algorithms use the 
linguistic probabilities to represent the belief at the root 
node and the strengths of the influences between the linked 
propositions. 
Expressions such as "very likely," "quite unlikely," 
and "maybe" to characterize the degree of likelihood of a 
statement are called the linguistic probabilities. The 
linguistic probabilities are employed in FST. AI 
researchers favoring FST argued that the probabilities 
require an unreasonable level of precision, whereas the 
linguistic values do not. 
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Wise [1986; Wise and Henrion, 1986] developed a 
framework for comparing UIS's to the probability theory 
supplemented by the principle of maximum entropy/minimum 
cross-entropy (ME/MXE). Wise's framework is justified 
mainly by the work by Cox [1946] who demonstrated that the 
axioms of probability are the necessary consequences of the 
intuitive properties of measures of belief. 
Based on the argument that the second-order probability 
theory capable of handling any input data is not 
computationally feasible, Wise proposed the use of the 
(first-order) probability theory supplemented by ME/MXE, 
instead of the second-order probability theory. The 
second-order probability distribution deals with the 
probability measures on the space of first-order (i.e., 
ordinary) probability distribution. 
The simulation model is adopted in the development of 
new algorithms, where the simulation model is developed 
based on Wise's framework. The simulation model is used in 
choosing the adequate operations performed on the linguistic 
probabilities. A part of the proposed algorithms, that is, 
a proposed scheme for a linguistic approximation is 
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implemented in C language. 
CHAPTER II 
EXISTING APPROACHES TO UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT 
IN EXPERT SYSTEMS 
Theory of Endorsement 
The typical non-numeric approach is the theory of 
endorsement (Cohen and Grinberg, 1983a; Cohen and Grinberg, 
1983b]. The theory of endorsement may be regarded as the 
extension of a truth maintenance system (TMS) developed by 
Doyle (1979]. TMS is a subsystem for performing a problem 
solving by recording and maintaining the reasons for 
beliefs. The basic line of arguments for the non-numeric 
approaches is that the reasoning programs must be able to 
make assumptions and subsequently revise their beliefs when 
discoveries contradict these assumptions. 
The fundamental problems with numerical approaches are 
(Cohen and Grinberg, 1983a]: (1) Numerical approaches are 
not able to treat different kinds of evidence differently. 
For example, numerical approaches are not able to 
discriminate eyewitness evidence from circumstantial 
evidence, because evidence is nothing more than a 
proposition with an associated number; and (2) Numerical 
approaches are not able to treat the same evidence 
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differently in different contexts. 
Suppose that a man was convicted on the basis of 
eyewitness testimony of a crime committed by another man of 
very similar appearance. Eyewitness testimony relies on 
some assumptions, one of them could be that individuals have 
distinctive appearances. If that assumption is violated, 
the evidence loses its reliability. 
TMS stores the justification at each node, where the 
justification is a record of the nodes on which each node 
depends. However, TMS makes little differentiation between 
kinds of justifications, i.e., it is primarily interested in 
whether a node has the support, not in what kind of support 
it has. The theory of endorsement was developed hoping that 
this weakness of TMS can be remedied. 
The crux of the theory of endorsement is to deal with 
the reasons for believing or disbelieving a hypothesis. 
Endorsements are records of reasons for believing or 
disbelieving a hypothesis: the reasons for believing being a 
positive endorsements and the reasons for disbelieving being 
the negative endorsements [Cohen and Grinberg, 1983a]. 
This theory has four components: endorsements, 
heuristics for ranking endorsements, heuristics for 
propagating endorsements over inference, and heuristics for 
discounting uncertainty. Endorsements can be propagated 
over inferences, but in a manner that is sensitive to the 
context of the inference. This theory was implemented in a 
program called SOLOMON which does a decision making for 
portfolio investment. 
Several drawbacks of the theory of endorsement have 
been pointed out by a number of researchers including 
Bhatnagar and Kanal (1986]. The main drawback is.how to 
differentiate between two competing hypotheses with 
different bodies of endorsements and select one over the 
other. This problem can occur due to the fact that we 
cannot assign any strict rank ordering to endorsements. 
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One suggested way to overcome this problem is to weigh 
endorsements against each other individually by a pairwise 
ranking, which increases the computational complexity. 
Cheeseman (1985] who is one of the AI researchers strongly 
defending the probability theory against non-Bayesian 
approaches, showed that all the basic ideas of this model 
can be explained by a deduction in the theory of relative 
probabilities. 
Bayesian Approach 
Table 3 (Berenji, 1987] summarizes the advantages, 
disadvantages and applications of the existing numeric 
approaches to uncertainty management in ESs. In AI 
community, there have been a number of debates between 
researchers favoring the Bayesian approach and those 
favoring non-Bayesian approaches. 
Researchers including Zadeh [1986b] and Shafer (1976] 
argued that the point-valued probability is inadequate to 
represent the uncertainty. They also argued that another 
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TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF EXISTING APPROACHES 
Approach Advantages Disadvantages Applications 
Original * Fast,simple * Ad hoc method *MYCIN,EMYCIN-
CF * Domain experts* is not based based and many 
approach pref er CF on a strong other expert 
more theory systems 
* inconsistent 
Revised * Improves CF * Use a weaker *MYCIN,EMYCIN-
CF approach model's CF theory than based,and many 
calculation the original other expert 
CF method systems 
Heckerman's* consistent * is based on *New, not any 
interpre- with probabi- strong inde- applications 
tation of CF lity axioms pendence reported so 
assumption far 
* Seldom applicable 
Bayesian * A sound and * Not expressive* PROSPECTOR 
probabili- formal theory enough to and many 
stic * not too complex easily handle others 
method to use all forms of 
uncertainty 
Dempster- * capability to * Dempster's rule* GISTER, and 
Shafer explicitly not applicable many other 
theory represent to conflicting 
ignorance evidences 
Possibility* Linguistic * Membership * PRUF, REVEAL 
theory and terms could be functions are SPII, RUM, 
fuzzy logic mathematically context depen- and many 
represented dent others 
Support * provides a * independence * No applica-
logic logic based assumptions tion reported 
programming treatment of required in so far 
value terms most cases 
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problem with the Bayesian approach consists in how to 
estimate the probabilities provided that we do not have 
sufficient information. On the other hand, others including 
Cheeseman, Pearl, Cox, Fox, and Lemmer have strongly 
defended the Bayesian approach by showing the inadequacy of 
non-Bayesian approaches. 
Zadeh [1986b] who introduced FST in 1965 defended FST 
by illustrating five examples which, he claims, do not lend 
themselves to solution by the probability theory. Some of 
the examples are as follows: (1) An urn contains n balls of 
various sizes. Several of the balls are large. What is the 
probability that a ball drawn at random is large; and (2) 
Given the proposition "most swedes are tall," find the 
fraction of Swedes who are very tall. 
Cox [1946] demonstrated that the axioms of probability 
are the necessary consequences of intuitive properties of 
measures of belief. That is, if a set of simple properties 
is assumed, the axioms of the probability theory must be 
accepted. Similarly, Horvitz et al. [1986] showed that the 
non-Bayesian approaches do not satisfy some of the intuitive 
properties of measures of belief. In response to Zadeh 
(1986b], Cheeseman [1986] showed how we can solve these 
problems FST claims the probability cannot_ solve, using the 
second-order probability theory. 
Cheeseman (1985] listed the following misconceptions 
held by researchers claiming the inadequacy of the 
probability theory [Cheeseman, 1985]: 
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(1) Probability is a frequency ratio. 
(2) Bayesian analysis requires a large amount of data. 
(3) Prior probabilities assume more information than given. 
(4) Numbers are not necessary. 
(5) More than one number is needed to represent uncertainty. 
(6) The Bayesian approach doesn't work. 
Fourth misconception is the criticism of non-numeric 
approaches, and fifth misconception is the criticism of DST. 
DST employs interval-valued probability to represent the 
uncertainty. 
In particular, he advocated the probability as a 
measure of belief rather than a frequency ratio, since a 
frequency interpretation of the probability severely 
restricts the domain of its applicability. In fact, even 
among the statisticians, there has been a disagreement on 
the definition of probability for a long time, where some 
statisticians favored the definition of probability as a 
measure of belief while the others favored the definition of 
probability as a frequency ratio. 
The definition of probability as a frequency ratio is 
as follows (Cheeseman, 1985]: 
"The probability of an event(hypothesis) is the ratio of the 
number of occurrences in which the event is true to the 
total number of such occurrences." 
This definition requires a large total number of such 
occurrences which may not be possible to obtain in a number 
of domains, especially medicine. This is one of the 
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arguments against the probability theory used by researchers 
favoring non-Bayesian approaches. 
On the other hand, the definition of probability as a 
measure of belief is as follows [Cheeseman, 1985]: 
"The (conditional) probability of a proposition given a 
particular evidence is a real number between zero and one, 
that is a measure of an entity's belief in that proposition, 
given the evidence." 
Bayes' theorem which is a core of the Bayesian 
approach, provides a method for updating the prior belief in 
a hypothesis H, represented as P(H), in light of a new 
evidence E to obtain the posterior belief P(HIE): 
P(Hj) *P(E I Hj) 
Bayes' theorem requires the probabilities P(Hi) and P(EIH;) 
to be known or estimated in advance. This is one of the 
major problems with the Bayesian approach, in that it 
requires a huge amount of statistical data to determine 
these probabilities. 
The Bayesian approach has been implemented in a number 
of ESs including an ES called PROSPECTOR to determine the 
major types of ore deposits present in a geological site. 
Principle of Maximum Entropy/Minimum Cross Entropy CME/MXE) 
ME was first applied by Jaynes [1979] to the 
statistical mechanics problem of predicting the most likely 
state of a system given the physical constraints (e.g., 
conservation of energy). Jaynes also used this method to 
provide the prior probabilities for the Bayesian analysis. 
This method was applied to the problem of finding the best 
approximation to a given probability distribution based on 
the knowledge of some of the joint probabilities. This 
method was employed by an ES called PROSPECTOR. 
26 
ME can be used in determining the prior probabilities. 
Suppose we know that a system has a set of possible states 
X; with unknown probabilities p*(X;), and you have the 
information about constraints on the distribution p*. 
Suppose you need to choose a distribution P that is the best 
estimate of p* given the available information. ME states 
that, of all the distributions that satisfy the constraints, 
we should choose the one P with the largest entropy, where 
entropy is represented by - ~;P(X;)* log(P(X;)) [Shore and 
Johnson, 1980]. 
It was argued that ME gives the most unbiased 
probability est~mates given the available evidences 
[Cheeseman, 1983; Jaynes, 1979; shore and Johnson, 1980]. 
Cheeseman (1983] introduced a new method for computing the 
ME probability of an event of interest, given the specific 
evidence about the related events, and subject to any linear 
probability constraints. His method was designed to avoid 
the combinatorial computational time inherent in other 
methods for computing ME values, without imposing strong 
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restrictions on the constraints that can be used. 
MXE is a generalization that applies in cases when a 
prior distribution P that estimates p* is known in addition 
to the constraints. Cross-entropy is defined as a measure 
of how much information one would have to receive to change 
one distribution into another. MXE states that, of the 
distributions that satisfy the constraints, we should choose 
the distribution Q with the least cross-entropy, where 
cross-entropy is defined as ~iP(Xi)*log[Q(Xi)/P(Xi)]. 
Minimizing cross-entropy is equivalent to maximizing entropy 
when the prior probabilities are uniformly distributed. 
Unlike the entropy maximization, cross-entropy minimization 
generalizes correctly for continuous probability 
distribution. 
Shore and Johnson [1980] showed that ME/MXE are 
uniquely correct methods for inductive inference when new 
information is given in the form of expected values. The 
* form of expected values includes ~i P (X;) * fk (X;) =a or a < 
* I:; P (X;) * fk (X;) < b, where a and b are constants, X; denotes 
t * I I the possible state, P (Xi) denotes the unknown probability, 
and fk denotes the mapping (function) from X; to the 
probability. 
However, there have been a number of researchers 
including Grosof [1986b] criticizing ME in that ME minimizes 
"information" in the rather specialized sense of Shannon 
information measure. 
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Bayesian Networks 
Gordon and Shortliffe [1984, 1985] who developed a CF 
approach, argued that the application of DST to the domain 
of MYCIN is more adequate than a CF approach. CF approach 
is the first non-Bayesian approach developed, where MYCIN is 
known to be the first ES developed based on a CF approach. 
They [1984] favored DST because of the drawbacks of Bayesian 
approach and of a CF approach. CF approach and DST is 
presented in detail later. 
Gordon and Shortliffe [1985] studied the application of 
DST to a reasoning in a tree-structured hierarchy of 
hypotheses. Pearl [1986c], who is one of the AI researchers 
favoring the Bayesian approach, showed that the Bayesian 
approach performs as well as DST in a tree-structured 
hierarchy of hypotheses. 
Bayesian networks are the directed acyclic graphs in 
which the nodes represent propositions, the arcs represent 
the existence of direct causal influences between the linked 
propositions, and the strengths of these influences are 
quantified by the conditional probabilities. 
The underlying assumption of Bayesian networks is the 
conditional independence defined below. A and B are 
conditionally independent of C iff P(A and Bl C)= P(A!C)* 
P(B!C). This underlying assumption has been criticized as 
the major weakness restricting its applicability to AI 
problems, primarily because this assumption is not 
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guaranteed to be true in the real world applications. 
Pearl [1986a; Kim and Pearl, 1983; 1985a; 1986a] 
presented the algorithms dealing with propagating the impact 
of new information through a singly-connected network with 
the time complexity of O(M), where M= the length of the 
longest path in the network, in such a way that when 
equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a 
measure of belief consistent with the axioms of the 
probability theory. A singly-connected network is a network 
in which there exists only one directed path between two 
nodes if there exists the causal relationship between two 
nodes. 
Metaprobability Theory 
Metaprobability theory is a higher order probability 
theory including the second-order probability theory. The 
second-order probability theory deals with probability 
measures on the space of first-order probability 
distribution which is defined over some domain state. A 
number of AI researchers including Zadeh criticized first-
order (ordinary) probability theory mainly in that it does 
not represent ignorance. 
On the other hand, Fung and Chong [1986] showed that 
the metaprobability theory can represent the ignorance. 
They concluded that the metaprobability th~ory is of 
practical use and it may perform better than DST in certain 
applications. These conclusions were based on the 
experiment to compare the performance of metaprobability 
theory with that of DST in updating the beliefs with an 
evidence. For the readers interested in the details of 
their experiment, refer to [Fung and Chung, 1986]. 
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Similarly, Wise, who developed a framework for 
comparing UIS's to the probability theory, argued that the 
second-order probability theory is capable of handling the 
generalized input including "imprecise" information which is 
not adequately dealt with by the first-order probability 
theory. An example of "imprecise" information could be "it 
will probably rain tomorrow." Cheeseman [1986] also made a 
similar argument. 
However, the second-order probability theory may not be 
computationally feasible in certain applications, while it 
offers all the advantages of the Bayesian approach. In 
fact, simply forming the first-order distribution to model 
an expert's belief state may be only marginally feasible, 
let alone forming a second-order distribution over all 
possible first-order distributions. 
certainty Factor (CF) Approach 
The CF approach is the first non-Bayesian approach 
proposed and developed by Buchanan and Shortliffe [1984a, 
1984b, 1984c]. It was implemented in MYCIN which is known 
to be the first ES to diagnose bacterial infections and 
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prescribe treatment for them, and also implemented in EMYCIN 
which is an ES shell developed out of MYCIN. The work on 
MYCIN was the part of Stanford Heuristic Programming Project 
which began in 1960's. The programming language used in 
developing MYCIN is LISP which is a well-known symbolic AI 
language. 
CF represents the measure of the belief update due to 
the new evidence. The value of CF lies between -1 and 1. 
The positive (negative) CF value indicates that the evidence 
confirms (disconfirms) the hypothesis to certain degrees. 
Horvitz and Heckerman [1986] emphasized the difference 
between the measure of absolute belief and measure of belief 
update. Their criticism of CF consists in that many ESs 
employing CF approach described CF as the measure of 
absolute belief at the knowledge acquisition stage, although 
CF in fact represents the measure of change in belief. 
There have been a number of other criticisms of CF 
approach: (1) Unlike the probability theory, CF approach is 
an ad hoc approach which is not based on a strong theory; 
and (2) In its combining schemes of aggregating several 
evidences, the assumption of maximum correlation between two 
evidences is implicitly used, although that assumption may 
not hold in some applications. On the other hand, CF 
approach is intuitively appealing to practitioners because 
of its simplicity, thus has been employed by a large number 
of ESs. 
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There are three variants of CF approach: the original 
CF approach, the revised CF approach, and Heckerman's 
interpretation of the CF approach. After the original CF 
approach was introduced by Buchanan and Shortliffe (1984b], 
they [1984c] revised the original CF approach to remedy its 
weaknesses. Heckerman's interpretation of the CF approach 
is a result of redefining the revised CF approach to remedy 
inconsistencies inherent in the revised CF approach. 
Original CF approach 
CF(H,E), MB(H,E), and MD(H,E) are defined below, where 
CF(H,E) denotes the net change in belief of a hypothesis H 
due to a new evidence E, MB(H,E) is an increased belief of a 
hypothesis H due to a new evidence E, and MD(H,E) is an 
increased disbelief of a hypothesis H due to a new evidence 
E: 
• CF(H,E)=MB(H,E)-MD(H,E) 
• MB(H,E)-[ l 
(max((P(HIE),P(H)]-P(H)]/ (1-P(H)] 
if P(H)=l 
otherwise 
• MD(H,E)-[ l 
[P(H)-min(P(HIE),P(H)]]/P(H) 
if P(H)=O 
otherwise 
Its characteristics are as follows: 
• 0 <= MB(H,E) <= 1, 0 <= MD(H,E) <= 1, and -1 <= CF(H,E) <= 
1; 
• MB(H,E)= 1, MD(H,E)= O, CF(H,E)= 1 if H is shown to be 
certain; 
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• MB(H,E)= O, MD(H,E)= 1, CF(H,E)= -1 if the negation of H 
is shown to be certain; 
• MB(H,E)= o if H is not confirmed by E; 
• MD(H,E)= o if H is not disconfirmed by E; 
• CF(H,E)= o if E neither confirms nor disconfirms H. 
The combining functions of CF approach are shown below, 
where H, H1 , and H2 denote the hypotheses, and E, E1 , and E2 
denote the evidences (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984b]. 
r-0 
-1 
if MD(H,E1 and E2)=1 
L. MB(H,E1)+ [MB(H,Ez) * (1-MB(H,E1)]] 
otherwise 
r- 0 
-1 
if MB(H,E, and E2)=1 
• MD(H,E1 and Ez)= 
L MD(H,E1)+ [MD(H,Ez) * [l-MD(H,E1)]] 
otherwise 
• MB(H, and Hz, E)= min(MB[H,,EJ ,MB[Hz,E]) 
• MD(H, and Hz, E)= max(MD[H,,EJ ,MD[Hz,E]) 
• MB(H1 or Hz, E)= max(MB[H1 ,EJ ,MB[Hz,E]) 
• MD(H1 or Hz, E)= min(MD[H11 E] ,MD[H2 ,E]) 
• If the truth or falsity of a piece of evidence E1 is not 
known with certainty, but a CF (based on prior evidence E) 
denoted by CF[E1 ,EJ is known reflecting the degree of belief 
. -. * * in E11 then if MB [H, E1 ] and MD [H, E,J are the degrees of 
belief and disbelief in H when E1 is known to be true with 
certainty then the actual degrees of belief and disbelief 
are given by: 
* MB[H, E,J= MB [H, E1 ] *max (0, CF[E11 E]) 
* MD[H,E1]= MD [H,E,J*max(O,CF[E11 EJ). 
Buchanan and Shortliffe (1984b] admitted the problem 
with the combining scheme to aggregate two evidences 
associated with a hypothesis H, in that it is built around 
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the intuitive grounds rather than the theoretical grounds. 
They concluded that CF approach have not avoided many of the 
problems inherent with the Bayesian approach, but it was an 
approach such that judgmental knowledge can be efficiently 
represented and utilized for the modeling of medical 
decision making, especially in contexts where (a) 
statistical data are lacking and (b) conditional 
independence can be assumed. 
On the other hand, Adams (1984] showed that a 
substantial part of the CF model is equivalent to the 
probability theory with the assumption of independence. His 
work implies that although the CF approach is the result of 
attempts to develop an alternative approach to the 
probability theory, the CF model can be reduced to a special 
case of the probability theory. To a certain extent, this 
result may strengthen the argument for the Bayesian 
approach. 
Revised CF Approach 
The original CF approach suffers from t~e following 
drawbacks (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984c]: (1) the 
potential for a single piece of negative (positive) evidence 
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to overwhelm several pieces of positive (negative) evidence; 
and (2) the computational expense of storing both MB's and 
MD's, rather than cumulative CF's. The revised CF approach 
was developed to remedy these drawbacks (Buchanan and 
Shortliffe, 1984c]. 
The first drawback of the original CF approach can be 
illustrated in the following example. Consider eight rules 
all supporting a hypothesis of interest with CF's in the 
range 0.4 to 0.8. Suppose that the combination of CF's of 
these eight rules supporting a hypothesis of interest 
results in a CF of 0.99. Also suppose that there is a 
single disconfirming rule with CF= 0.8. Then the net 
support for a hypothesis of interest would be CF= MB-MD= 
0.999-0.8= 0.1999. This result is counterintuitive and also 
occasionally led MYCIN to reach incorrect inferences, 
especially where the absolute value of final CF less than, 
say, 0.2 is eliminated from further consideration. In 
MYCIN, in order to make inferences efficient, a final belief 
below the established threshold, e.g., 0.2, is eliminated 
from further consideration. 
In the revised CF approach, the definition of CF is 
unchanged for any single piece of evidence and that the 
combining function is unchanged when both CF's are of the 
same sign. The change occurs only when two CF's of opposite 
sign are co.lllbined. The definition of revised CF is: CF= 
(MB-MD)/ (1-min(MB,MD)] 
36 
The propagation of uncertainty is accomplished by the 
repeated applications of two combination schemes, that is, 
parallel combination and sequential combination (Heckerman, 
1986). The parallel combination scheme is as follows: 
I CF {H, E,) 
IH CF {H, E2) 
E2 ___ _. 
=========> 
CF {H, E1 and E2 ) 
E1 and E2 > H 
Let X= CF{H,E1), Y= CF{H,E2), and Z= CF{H, E1 and E2). 
z = t X+ Y- X*Y X,Y >= 0 {X+Y)/(1-min{IXI, IYl)J X,Y of opposite sign 
X+ Y+ X*Y X,Y < 0 
The sequential combination scheme is as follows: 
CF(E,E*) CF(H,E) 
E* > E > H =======> ------> H 
* Let W= CF{E,E ), X= CF(H,E), Y= CF(H,not E), and Z= 
* CF {H, E ) • 
-[ W*X 
z -W*Y 
w >= 0 
w < 0 
Heckerman's Interpretation of CF Approach 
Heckerman (1986) redefined CF in order to eliminate the 
inconsistency between the definition of the revised CF and 
its combining schemes. The redefined CF is called 
Heckerman's interpretation of the CF approach. Heckerman 
argued that it is inappropriate to regard the combining 
schemes as approximated combination rules for the CF in that 
there are inconsistencies between the definition of CF and 
the combining schemes. 
Consider a hypothesis H and an evidence E. Let P(H) 
and P(HIE) denote the prior, and posterior belief (or 
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probability) in H, respectively. Since CF(H,E) is a measure 
of the change in belief in H given E, it is reasonable to 
expect that there is some function f such that P(HIE)= 
f(CF(H,E), P(H)). After a number of manipulations on Bayes' 
theorem, we can obtain the following equation: 
P(EI H,e) 
O(HI E,e)= O(HI e) (1) 
P(EI -H,e) 
where O(X)= P(X)/ (1-P(X)), H= a hypothesis, e= prior 
evidence, and E= new evidence. 
The ratio in equation (1) is called a "likelihood 
ratio." An· equation (1) can be written as O(HIE,e)= 
L(H,E,e)* O(HI e), where L(H,E,e) denotes a likelihood 
ratio. The L(H,E,e) represent a belief update, thus can be 
considered as a potential probabilistic interpretation for 
CF. The only difficulty with L is that it ranges from o to 
infinity (oo) rather than from -1 to 1. We can resolve this 
problem easily by setting CF(H,E)= F(L(H,E,e)) where Fis 
some function which maps L into [-1,1]. 
One possible choice for the function F is as follows: 
r- (X-1) I x 
F1 (X) = 11-J 
L X-1 
x >= 1 
x < 1 
This function generates the following probabilistic 
38 
interpretation for CF, after Bayes' theorem is applied: 
I [P(HIE)-P(H)]/[P(HIE)*(l-P(H))] for PCHIE) > P(H) 
_J 
L [P(HIE)-P(H)]/[P(H)*(l-P(HIE)] for P(H) > P(HIE) 
It can be shown that any monotonically increasing 
function F which satisfies F(l/X)= -F(X) and F(~)= 1 
generates a valid probabilistic interpretation for a CF. A 
function F is called a monotonically increasing function if 
and only if for x1 <= x2 , F(x1) <= F(x2). This implies that 
this redefinition accommodates an unlimited number of 
probabilistic interpretations for the CF. Heckerman's work 
consolidated an argument for the probability theory by 
demonstrating a clear relationship between the CF and the 
probability theory. 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) 
DST was introduced by Shafer [1976] as an extension of 
the work of Arthur Dempster [1967] in the probability 
theory. As discussed earlier, even Gordon and Shortliffe 
[1984] who developed the CF approach defended DST as an 
alternative approach to the Bayesian approach and the CF 
approach. Furthermore, they suggested that DST is more 
appropriate than the Bayesian approach and the CF approach 
in especially medical domain due to its ability to model the 
narrowing of the hypothesis set with the accumulation of 
evidences. 
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Suppose a physician is considering a case of 
cholestatic jaundice for which there is a diagnostic 
hypothesis set of hepatitis(hep), cirrhosis(cirr), 
gallstone(gall) and pancreatic cancer(pan). In DST, this 
set is called "a frame of discernment", denoted FD. Each 
hypothesis in FD corresponds to a one-element subset called 
a "singleton." The hypotheses in FD are assumed mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. Subsets A1 ,A2 , ••• ,An are defined 
to be mutually exclusive if Ai n Aj= ¢for every i != j. 
Subsets A1 ,A2 , ••• ,An are defined to be mutually exhaustive if 
A1 U A2 U .•• U An= W, where W denotes the whole set. 
DST uses a number in the range [O,l] to indicate the 
belief in a hypothesis given a piece of evidence. The 
impact of each distinct piece of evidence on the subsets of 
FD is represented by a function called a "basic probability 
assignment (bpa)" which is a generalization of the 
traditional probability density function. 
The "bpa," denoted "m," assigns a number in the range 
[O,l] to all subsets of FD such that the numbers sum to 1, 
whereas the traditional probability density function assigns 
a number in the range [O,l] to every "singleton" of FD such 
that the numbers sum to 1. 
A belief function denoted Bel, assigns to the subset A 
of FD the sum of the beliefs committed exactly to every 
subset of A. The quantity 1-Bel(Ac) expresses the 
plausibility of A, i.e., the extent to which the evidence 
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allows one to fail to doubt A, where 'c' denotes the 
complement. Thus, the information contained in Bel 
concerning a given subset A may be expressed by the interval 
(Bel(A), 1-Bel(Ac)J. We can argue that DST allows the 
belief to be expressed as the interval, contrary to the 
probability theory in which a single-valued probability is 
assigned to each event. 
In the Bayesian approach, Bel(A)+ Bel(Ac)= 1, thus the 
width of the interval (Bel(A), 1-Bel(Ac)] becomes o. On the 
other hand, in DST, the width of the interval is usually not 
O and can be regarded as a measure of the belief that is 
committed to neither the hypothesis A nor the negation of 
the hypothesis A, i.e., a measure of ignorance. The fact 
that DST allows the explicit representation of ignorance 
unlike the Bayesian approach is regarded as one of the major 
advantages of DST over the Bayesian approach. 
The scheme to combine multiple evidences is presented 
below [Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984c]. Given two belief 
functions, based on two observations, but with the same 
frame of discernment, Dempster's (combination) rule computes 
a new belief function, where mass1 , mass2 and mass3 represent 
bpa•s. 
A,B,C e FD, mass3 (C)=(l-K)-1 ~ mass1 (A)*mass2 (B) 
AnB=C 
where K= ~ mass1 (A)*mass2 (B) < 1 
AnB=~ 
After Dempster's combining scheme is applied, it is 
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possible for the empty set to have the positive bpa. 
Dempster•s rule states that this problem can be remedied by 
the normalization of assigned values. The normalization 
procedure reassigns the bpa's which are assigned to null 
sets, to the non-empty sets. However, the normalization 
procedure used in Dempster•s rule has been criticized by 
several AI researchers including Zadeh [1986a] in that it 
causes inconsistency. 
Zadeh (1986a] viewed DST as the application of a 
retrieval technique to the second-order relations in the 
context of a relational database. The second-order relation 
is defined as the relation in which the data entries are 
relations in first normal form. A relation is said to be in 
first normal form iff it satisfies the constraint that it 
contains atomic values only. 
Consider a relation EMP3: (Name, Age(car)), where the 
query is to determine the fraction of employees who have the 
cars whose ages are between 2 and 4. Note that a relation 
EMP3 is the second-order relation. If the normalization is 
performed, then we get the conclusion that all employees 
have cars that are two to four years old. However, if the 
normalization is not performed, the conclusion we get is 
that 2 employees out 5 have a car that is two to four years 
old. Apparently, the conclusion obtained after the 
normalization is misleading due to the fact that the 
normalization eliminates the null values from consideration. 
Hunter [1987] also pointed out the problem with a 
normalization of Dempster's rule by comparing it to a 
probabilistic logic. 
EMP3: Name 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
AgeCcarl 
[3,4] 
[2,3] Note: '-' denotes the null value 
indicating the employee has no 
car. 
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Garvey et al. [1981] developed the inference rules for 
DST. His inference rules are as presented below, where the 
statement above the line in each rule allows the statement 
below the line to be inferred. 
(1) 
FD: [ 1, l] 
A € FD 
(2) 
A: [O,l] 
A: [S, (A) IP, (A)] 
(3) A: [S2 (A),P2 (A)] 
(4) 
A: [S(~),P(A)], where S(A)= max[S1 (A),S2 (A)] 
P(A)= min[P1 (A),P2 (A)] 
A: [S(A),P(A)] 
-A: [S(-A),P(-A)], where S(-A)=l-P(A), P(-A)~l-S(A), 
and ,-,=not 
A: [S(A),P(A)] 
(5) B: [S(B),P(B)] 
AU B: [S(A U B),P(A U B)], 
where S(A U B)= max[S(A),S(B)J 
P(A u B)= min[l,P(A)+P(B)] 
(6) AU B: [S(A U B),P(A U B)] 
A: [S(A),P(A)J 
B: [S(B),P(B)], where S(B)= max[O,S(A U B)-P(A)] 
P(B)= P(A U B) 
(7) A: [S(A),P(A)] 
B: [S(B),P(B)] 
An B: [S(AnB),P(AnB)J 
where S(AnB)= max[O,S(A)+S(B)-1] 
P(AnB)= min[P(A),P(B)] 
(8) An B: [S(AnB) ,P(AnB) J 
A: [S(A),P(A)] 
B: [S(B) ,P(B)] 
where S(B)= S(AnB) 
P(B)= min[l,l+P(AnB)-S(A)]. 
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The advantages of DST are: (1) DST is able to model the 
narrowing of the hypothesis set with the accumulation of 
evidence; (2) DST allows the explicit representation of 
ignorance which is committed neither to hypothesis nor to 
the negation of hypothesis; (3) DST is based on a relatively 
firm.mathematical foundation, especially compared to an ad 
hoc approach such as the CF approach; and (4) If the arcs of 
semantic nets have the associated confidences which is 
represented as the interval-valued probabilities, then 
Dempster's rule can be used to combine them for non-
monotonic reasoning system [Ginsberg, 1984]. 
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The monotonic and non-monotonic reasoning system are 
presented below. A formal logic leads to a monotonic 
reasoning system. In a monotonic reasoning system, once the 
truth value of any predicate becomes "true", it remains 
"true." However, these characteristics of a monotonic 
reasoning system have the limitation in that it cannot be 
applied in the real world for the reasons including one that 
available information is frequently incomplete, at any given 
decision point. In dealing with these difficulties, human 
problem solvers often use the beliefs that are subject to 
change given further information. 
Contrary to a monotonic reasoning system, a non-
monotonic reasoning system tracks a set of tentative beliefs 
and revises those beliefs when new knowledge is observed. 
TMS [Doyle, 1979] and the theory of endorsement [Cohen and 
Grinberg, 1983a] can be regarded as the non-monotonic 
reasoning systems. 
The disadvantages of DST are summarized as follows: 
(1) Its underlying assumption that a frame of discernment is 
assumed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, leads to an 
exponential-time requirements which makes it intractable 
computationally; (2) Dempster's rule requires that the 
bodies of evidence to be combined be independent and from 
the same frame of discernment; (3) Dempster's rule is not 
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applicable to the conflicting evidences; and (4) The 
normalization of Dempster's rule leads to counter-intuitive 
results. 
Suppose that the number of elements comprising a frame 
of discernment is 20, which may not even be of a reasonable 
size in real world applications. The number of subsets 
becomes 1048576 (=2 20 ) to which the bpa's are assigned. If 
we consider the fact that when the evidences are combined, 
bpa's assigned to all subsets need to be updated, we can see 
a huge computational time requirement. 
Thus, there have been a number attempts to reduce this 
exponential time complexity: Barnett's algorithm [1981], and 
Gordon and Shortliffe's algorithm [1985]. First, Barnett 
[1981] showed that an exponential-time requirement of DST 
can be reduced to simply a polynomial time if DST is applied 
to single hypotheses and to their negations, and if 
evidences are combined in a specified order. However, the 
condition that the evidences are applied to single 
hypotheses and to their negations may be too strong to hold 
in the real world applications. 
Second, Gordon and Shortliffe [1985] developed a new 
method, namely, a variant of Barnett's method that achieves 
the computational efficiency while permitting the management 
of evidential reasoning in a tree-structured hierarchical 
hypothesis space. Their algorithm is based on the pruning 
of a tree which reduces the computational complexity. 
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Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and Its Applications 
FST was introduced by Zadeh (1965] in 1965. It is a 
mathematical generalization of the (ordinary) set theory. 
Unlike the conventional set theory which requires full 
membership or non-membership for the elements of a universe 
of discourse in a set, a fuzzy set allow partial membership. 
Because the ordinary set A={l,2,3,4} does not contain 
the element 6, its membership value is false (or O). 
However, in a fuzzy set "tall"= {l/6'10", 0.9/6'1", 
0.6/5 1 10"}, where the first element of a fuzzy set pair 
denotes the membership value and its second element denotes 
the height, for example, the membership of the height 6'1" 
is 0.9. 
There have been a number of studies to compare FST to 
the Bayesian approach in terms of performance. First, 
Stalling (1977] applied both FST and the Bayesian approach 
to a syntactic pattern recognition of handwritten capitals, 
and concluded that the Bayesian approach offers the 
computational and philosophical advantages over FST. 
Second, Maier and Sherif [1985] demonstrated that FST is 
applicable to a wide range of industrial controller problems 
and a simple fuzzy control algorithm performs nearly as well 
as the probability-based control algorithm. 
Finally, Tribus (1980] applied FST and the probability 
theory to the problem of literature search, and concluded 
that there is no significant difference to favor one over 
the other. We can conclude that the experimental results 
are mixed or inconclusive. 
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AI researchers favoring FST argue that the Bayesian 
approach is not appropriate to handle especially "imprecise" 
information, e.g., "it will probably rain tomorrow." On the 
other hand, AI researchers favoring the Bayesian approach 
argued that FST is context-dependent and since the second-
order probability theory can handle "imprecise" information, 
FST is unnecessary. For instance, the fuzzy set "young"= 
{1/18, 0.9/20, 0.6/30}, could be defined in the context of 
college students, whereas it could be defined differently in 
the context of elementary school students. 
We could argue that the choice between FST and the 
Bayesian approach may be dependent upon the advantages of 
approaches in terms of the psychological accessibility of 
probabilistic information in different formats. This 
implies that FST and the Bayesian approach perform better 
under different sets of conditions. 
A fuzzy variable is defined as follows [Zadeh, 1975a]: 
A fuzzy variable is characterized by a triple (X,U,R(X:u)) 
in which X is the name of the variable; U is the universe of 
discourse (finite or infinite set); u is a generic name for 
the elements of U; and R(X:u) is a fuzzy subset of U which 
represent a fuzzy restriction on the values of u imposed by 
x. Some examples of a fuzzy variable are "young," "old," 
and "not young and not old." Like the conventional (or 
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nonfuzzy) variable, the marginal restriction (analogous to 
the marginal distribution), conditional restriction 
(analogous to the conditional distribution), noninteraction 
(analogous to independence) and intersection (an~logous to 
dependence) are defined for a fuzzy variable. 
A possibility theory was developed by Zadeh [1978a] as 
an extension of FST. It focuses primarily on imprecision 
which is intrinsic in the natural languages. He argued that 
a language is possibilistic rather than probabilistic. A 
possibility distribution function associated with X is 
defined to be numerically equal to the membership function 
of a fuzzy variable. Suppose that a fuzzy set "small 
integer" be defined as {1/1, 1/2, 0.8/3, 0.6/4, 0.4/5}. The 
proposition "X is a small integer" associates with X a 
possibility distribution {1/1, 1/2, 0.8/3, 0.6/4, 0.4/5}. 
There is a distinctive difference between a possibility 
distribution and the probability distribution. If we 
consider the statement "Hans ate X eggs for breakfast," 
[Zadeh, 1978a] then a possibility distribution with X is 
interpreted as the degree of ease with which Hans can eat X 
eggs, whereas the probability distribution with X is the 
probability that Hans ate X eggs. However, there is a weak 
relationship between the probability distribution and a 
possibility distribution. The relationships between the 
probability distribution and a possibility distribution are 
to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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Because a possibility distribution is analogous to the 
probability distribution to some extent, the concepts 
analogous to a multivariate probability distribution, a 
marginal probability distribution, and the conditional 
probability distribution are defined in a possibility 
theory. They are called n-ary possibility distribution, a 
marginal possibility distribution, and the conditional 
possibility distribution, respectively. 
A linguistic variable is defined as a variable of a 
higher order than a fuzzy variable, in the sense that a 
linguistic variable takes fuzzy variables as its values 
[Zadeh, 1975a]. For example, a linguistic variable "age" 
can take the values such as "young," "very young," and "old" 
which are fuzzy variables. A variable taking the linguistic 
truth values as its values is called a linguistic truth 
variable, where the expressions such as "very true," "quite 
true," and "completely false" to characterize the degree of 
truth of a statement are called linguistic truth values 
[Zadeh, 1975a]. 
A linguistic (truth) value is defined as a fuzzy subset 
of the interval [O,l]. For instance, a linguistic truth 
value "true" could be defined as {0.5/0.7, 0.7/0.8, 0.9/0.9, 
1/1}. A linguistic truth variable is a special case of a 
linguistic variable in that a linguistic truth variable 
takes only linguistic truth values as its values. Zadeh 
[1975a] defined a number of operations on linguistic truth 
values including a negation, a conjunction, a disjunction, 
imply, modus ponens, and a generalized modus ponens. 
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Modus ponens is the basic rule of inference in the 
traditional logic such that we can infer the truth of a 
proposition B from the truth of A and the implication A => 
B. Similarly, given "u is more or less small" and "IF u is 
small THEN v is large," a generalized modus ponens could 
lead to the conclusion "vis more or less large." 
Like the conventional probability theory, a linguistic 
probability (analogous to the conventional probability), a 
linguistic random variable (analogous to a random variable 
in the probability theory), and a linguistic probability 
distribution (analogous to the conventional probability 
distribution) are defined for a linguistic variable. 
Treating truth as a linguistic variable leads to a 
fuzzy (linguistic) logic that provides a basis for 
approximate reasoning. That is, approximate reasoning is a 
mode of reasoning in which the truth-values and the rules of 
inference are fuzzy rather than precise. For example, given 
two facts, "most students are undergraduates" and "most 
undergraduates are young," the answer to the question "how 
many students are young?" can be obtained from a fuzzy 
logic. 
Since FST was introduced by Zadeh in 1965, it has been 
applied to a variety of areas including decision making 
problems in management, engineering, and even in 
mathematics. Mamdani [1976] surveyed the field of 
applications of a fuzzy logic in the synthesis of 
controllers for dynamic plants and concluded that the 
application performs well as expected. Kuang 
[1986a,1986b,1986c] showed the application of FST to 
hydraulic systems diagnostics and troublesho9ting. Adamo 
[1980a] introduced a fuzzy decision tree method that is an 
extension to a decision tree in which the involved data 
(probabilities, costs, profits, losses) are represented as 
linguistic values. 
Zimmermann [1986] and Prade [1980] discussed the 
application of FST to the mathematical programming models. 
In general, the mathematical programming models can be 
written as follows: Maximize f (X) 
s.t. g 1 (X) >= 0 
For example, LP model can be written as follows: 
Maximize Z= CT*X 
s.t. A*X <= b 
x >= 0 
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where c and X are row-vectors of dimension n, b is a column- · 
vector of dimension m, and A is an m x n matrix. 
Unlike the conventional mathematical programming models 
in which the elements of A,b,C are crisp numbers, a fuzzy 
mathematical programming model permits the elements of A,b,c 
to be fuzzy numbers. crisp number is the term to denote the 
ordinary (non-fuzzy) number and used to distinguish it from 
52 
a fuzzy number. A fuzzy number is defined as a fuzzy subset 
of real numbers, where "small," "approximately 8," "very 
close to 5 11 are its examples. Zimmermann discussed the 
fuzzy linear and nonlinear programming problems and 
algorithms to determine the optimal solution. 
The algorithms for fuzzy mathematical programming 
problems are primarily built around the algorithms for 
(ordinary) mathematical programming problems. 
Prade (1980] argued that the adaption of an ordinary 
algorithm to a fuzzy mathematical programming problem is not 
always straightforward. On the other hand, although the 
direct application of FST can solve the problem, it is not 
generally computationally attractive. Prade also discussed 
PERT, assignment problem, a traveling salesman problem, and 
a transportation problem. 
There have been a number of FST applications to 
mathematics. Trillas and Riera (1978] introduced the 
general types of entropies for fuzzy sets. Kim and Roush 
[1980] developed a fuzzy matrix theory. A fuzzy matrix is 
defined as a matrix whose entries are the values in [0,1], 
where its example is shown below. 
[o. 8 A= 
0.2 
Several languages based on FST including L.P.L. 
language (linguistic oriented programming language) and PRUF 
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(Possibilistic Relational Universal Fuzzy), have been 
developed. PRUF is a meaning representation language for 
natural language processing. Some of the characteristics of 
PRUF are (Zadeh, 1978b]: (1) A basic assumption underlying 
PRUF is that the imprecision that is intrinsic in natural 
languages is, possibilistic rather than probabilistic; (2) 
The logic underlying PRUF is a fuzzy logic; and (3) The 
quantifiers in PRUF are allowed to be linguistic such as 
"most, " "many, 11 "few. " 
Fuzzy quantifiers denote the collection of quantifiers 
in natural languages whose representative elements are: 
"most," "many," "quite a few," and "frequently." [Kandel, 
1986]. Zadeh (1983b] introduced the computational approach 
to fuzzy quantifiers, in which quantifiers are treated as 
fuzzy numbers. L.P.L. language developed by Adamo 
(1980b,1980c] has the characteristics similar to those of 
PRUF. 
Support Logic Programming (SLOP) 
FST has a major advantage over the Bayesian approach in 
that it is capable of handling the "imprecise" information, 
while DST has a number of advantages, one of which is that 
it allows the interval-valued belief instead of a single-
valued belief (or probability). Baldwin (1986] developed a 
programming language called SLOP which is similar to Prolog 
except that it employs the main features of FST and DST. 
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Prolog is one of the well-known AI languages based on first 
order logic. 
SLOP generalizes a logic programming to the case where 
uncertainties, either of a probability or fuzzy nature, 
could be modeled. SLOP is a Prolog-like programming system 
in which uncertainties associated with facts and rules are 
represented by a pair of support factors [Sn.Sp], where Sn 
and SP are called the necessary support and the possible 
support, respectively. The necessary support can be viewed 
as a lower bound, whereas a possible support can be viewed 
as an upper bound. 
The following is an example of SLOP: 
design(X,good) :- eng_report(X,satisfactory), 
reliability(X,high): [0.9,1]. 
This rule states that if the engineering report about design 
X is satisfactory and its reliability is high, then the 
design is considered to be good with the necessary support 
of .9 and a possible support of 1. 
Unlike Prolog, fuzzy predicates such as "good" and 
"high" are allowed. Also, in contrast to Prolog in which 
the degree of belief attached to a rule always equals 1, the 
deg~ee of belief associated with a rule is expressed as the 
interval-valued number like DST. 
Furthermore, in contrast to an ordinary logic and 
PROLOG, SLOP does not rely upon a CWA wi~h regard to the 
knowledge representation. In other words, it is not assumed 
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that facts which are not in the data are necessarily false. 
A fact not present in the knowledge base has the necessary 
support of o and a possible support of 1. The general forms 
of .SLOP are as follows: 
A:- B1,B2 , ••• ,Bn: rs1 ,S2], where S1= necessary support and 
s 2= possible support 
A : rs, ,S2 ] • rs,, S2 ] is equivalent to the interval 
rBel(A),1-Bel(-A)] of DST, where s 2-s1 is the measure of the 
ignorance in support of the rule. 
The interpretation of a negation is as follows: 
- * * h * If P :-Q: rs1 ,S2 ], then P :- Q: rs 1 ,S2 ], were S1 = l-S2 
* and s 2 = 1-s,. 
Similarly, if P 
* and s 2 = l-S1 • 
The SLOP calculus allows different models for combining 
evidences, that is, a multiplication model and min model: 
(Case 1) X:[S1 (X),S2 (X)], Y:[S1 (Y),S2 (Y)], X and Y:(S1 (X and 
Y),S2 (X and Y)J, and x or Y:(S 1 (X or Y),S2 (X or Y)] 
(1) multiplication model:S1 (X and Y)= s 1 (X)* s 1 (Y) 
S2 (X and Y)= S2 (X)* S2 (Y) 
s, (X or Y)= s, (X)+ s, (Y)- s, (X) * 
S1 (Y) 
S2 (X or Y)= S2 (X)+ S2 (Y)- S2 (X)* 
S2 (Y) 
(2) min model:S1 (X and Y)= s 1 (X) • s 1 (Y) 
s, (X or Y) =s, (X) v s, (Y) 
S1 ((not A) or (not B))=S1 (not A) v S1 (not B) 
s2 (X and Y) = s2 (X) " s2 (Y) 
S2(X or Y)= s2(X) v S2(Y), where ,,.., denotes 
the minimum and 'v' denotes the maximum 
(Case 2) P :-Q :(S1 (P!Q),S2(P!Q)], Q:[S,(Q),S2(Q)] and P: 
[S1 (P) ,S2 (P)] 
(1) multiplication model:S1 (P)= S1 CPIQ)* S1 (Q) 
s2(P)= 1-[1- S2CPIQ)* S1 (Q)] 
(2) min model:no general formulae available 
(Case 3) P:[S1 (P),S2(P)], Q:[S1 (Q),S2(Q)] and P => Q: 
[S1 (P=>Q) ,S2(P=>Q)] 
(1) multiplication model:S1 (P => Q)= S1 (PIQ)* S1 (Q) 
S2(P => Q)= 1- [1- S2(P!Q)* S1 (Q)] 
(2) min model:no general formulae available, where "=>"= 
imply 
(Case 4) P: [S1 ,U,J and P: [S2,U2] and P: [S,U] 
(1) multiplication model:S= (S 1* U2+ S2* u 1- S1* S2)/K 
(2) min model: 
U= [ ( 1-U1) * ( 1-S2) + ( 1-U2) * (U1-
S1) ] I K 
K= 1- S2* (1-u,)- s,* (l-U2) 
(if there is a conflict):S= s 1 v S2 
U= 1-[(1-S1 (not P)) v (1-S2(not 
P))] 
(if there is not conflict):identical to Case 1 
SLOP could be used in conjunction with FRIL (Fuzzy 
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Relational Inference Language) . FRIL, developed by Baldwin 
and Zhou [1984], is a query language similar to ordinary 
query languages such as SQL and INGRESS except that FRIL can 
access fuzzy base relations. A relation "Person_height_l" 
shown below is a fuzzy base relation. 
The typical characteristics of a fuzzy relation are: 
(1) A fuzzy variable such as "tall" or "not tall" or "very 
tall" is allowed as the legal value of attribute, e.g., in 
"Person_height_l" and (2) the additional attribute 
"membership" is needed in "Person_height_l." 
Person_height_l: Name 
Adrian 
Bill 
Lofti 
Laurie 
Height 
$Tall 
not $Tall 
5-10 
membership 
1 
1 
1 
$Very tall 1 
CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED ALGORITHMS FOR BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Pearl's Algorithms 
As defined earlier, Bayesian networks are directed 
acyclic graphs with each node representing a proposition (or 
variable), each arc signifying the existence of direct 
causal influence between the linked propositions, and the 
strengths of these influences quantified by conditional 
probabilities [Pearl, 1986a]. Pearl[1982; Kim and Pearl, 
1983; 1985a; 1986a] developed the algorithms (for the 
singly-connected network) to impart the impact of new 
information to all nodes by local propagation in time 
proportional to the longest path in the network. 
The singly-connected network in which there exists only 
one (undirected) path between any pair of nodes, includes a 
tree structure in which each node is allowed to have at most 
one parent node and a network structure in which each node 
is allowed to have multiple parent nodes. In this section, 
Pearl's algorithm for a tree structure is described first, 
followed by the description of an algorithm for the network 
structure. 
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Pearl's Algorithm for a Tree Structure 
In a tree structure, each node B stores two parameters, 
~(B) and o(B), where ~(B) is the support attributed to node 
B by its parent node and o(B) is the support node B receives 
from its child node(s). ~(B) shall be referred to as 
"ancestor belief" and o(B) shall be referred to as 
"descendant belief." ~(B) and o(B) are defined as follows: 
~(B)= P(BIDs+> and o(B)=P(Da-IB), where DB"and DB+ denote the 
data contained in a tree rooted at B and the data contained 
in the rest of a tree, respectively. 
The belief of node B is obtained by combining these two 
supports via the product Bel(B)= a* ~(B)* o(B), where a and 
Bel denote a normalizing constant and the belief, 
respectively. A normalizing constant is necessary, when Bel 
becomes a vector, to make the sum of the elements of the 
vector to be 1. 
Several types of nodes which require special treatments 
are identified by Pearl [1986a]: 
(1) Anticipatory node (a leaf node that has not been 
instantiated yet): For such a node x, o(x)= (1 1 1 ... 1). 
(2) Data node (a node with instantiated value): Given that a 
node x has a number of outcomes, if the jth outcome of node 
x is observed to be true, we set ~(x)= o(x)= (O o o 1 
o ••. O) with 1 at the jth position. Suppose a node x 
represents the killer and there are four suspects. If we 
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have a witness evidence to convince that the 4th suspect is 
the killer, then 7r(X)= o(X)= (0 0 0 1). 
(3) Dummy node (a node representing judgmental evidence 
bearing on another node): for a dummy node B, we do not 
specify 7r(B) or o(B) but, instead, define o8 (A) as K* 
PCBIA), where K is constant. We define oE(B) as the message 
sent from a node E (a child node of node B) to a node B, 
whereas 7r8 (A) denotes the message sent from a node A (the 
parent node of node B) to a node B. 
(4) Root node: At the root node x, we set 7r(x)= prior 
probability of the root node. 
Given 7r(X) and o(x) stored with each node x, the major 
problem is to determine how the influence of new information 
will spread through a tree, namely, how the parameters 7r(x) 
and o(x) of a node x can be determined from those of its 
neighbor nodes. The propagation scheme [Pearl, 1986a] 
consists of the following four steps: 
Step 1: When a node B is activated to update its parameters, 
it simultaneously checks the 7r8 (A) message communicated by 
its parent node A and the messages o1 (B), o2(B) •.• 
communicated by each of its child nodes. 
Step 2: o(B) is computed as the product of o1 (B), o2(B), .. ~: 
o(B)= o,(B)* 02(B)*···= 71" ok(B). 
k 
Step 3: 7r(B) is computed using 7r(B)= P* P(BIA)* 7r8 (A), where 
p is a no.rmalizing constant. 
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Step 4: Using the messages received together with the 
updated values of o(B) and ~(B), each node B computes the 
new messages sent to its child node(s) and its parent node. 
Step 5 (Bottom-up propagation): The new message o8 (A) that a 
node B sends to its parent node A is computed by o8 (A)= 
o(B)* P(BIA). 
step 6 (Top-down propagation): The new message ~E(B) that a 
node B sends to its kth child node E is computed by ~E(B)= 
a* ~(B)* ~ om(B), or alternatively, 
m !=k 
Bel (B) 
oE (B) 
where a and a' are normalizing constants, and '!' denotes 
"not." 
Figure 5 shows six successive stages of belief propagation 
through a binary tree [Pearl, 1986a]. 
Pearl's Algorithm for the Network Structure 
Pearl's algorithm for the network structure is 
presented based on Figure 4 [Pearl, 1986a]: 
B c 
" 
/ 
A 
x y 
Figure--4. :EX-ample of 
the network structure 
-·---11> Top-down propagation 
of-----· Bottom-up propagation 
Figure 5. Illustration of Belief Propagation 
in Bayesian Networks 
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At each arc two parameters ~ and o are stored, where ~ 
denotes the "ancestor belief" contributed by its parent 
nodes and o denotes the "descendant belief" contributed by 
its child nodes. Each node contains the conditional 
probability to represent the strength of causal influence 
between the linked nodes. In Figure 4, the arc linking a 
node B to a node A stores ~A(B) and oA(B), where they 
represent the message sent from node B to node A and the 
message sent from node A to node B, respectively. The node 
A stores the conditional probability P(AIB and C). 
As can be seen in Figure 4, the link A ~~> Y 
partitions the graph into two parts: an upper subgraph, GAY+, 
and a lower subgraph GAY-. GAY- is a subtree rooted at node Y, 
while GAY- is the rest of the network. DA/ is defined as the 
data contained in GA/, while DAY- is defined as the data 
contained in GAY-. The overall strength of belief in node A 
is calculated as follows: Bel(A)= a* P(DAx-1 A)* P(DAY-1 A)* 
[E(P(AI B,C)* P(BI DM+)* P(CI D~·))]= a* ox(A)* oy(A)* E(P(AI 
B,C)* ~A(B)* ~A(C)). 
The belief of a node B can be calculated as follows: 
BEL(B)= a* ~A(B)* oA(B), where a= a normalizing constant 
Given the parameters ~ and o stored with each link, the 
influence of new information is spread through the network 
via the messages to its parent nodes and child nodes. The 
schemes of updating the messages are shown below: 
oA(B)= a* E [~A(C)* E(ox(A)* Oy(A)* P(AI Band C))J; and 
~x(A>= a* oy(A)* [EP(AI Band C)* ~A(B)* ~A(C)]. 
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Wise's Framework 
Before Wise's framework is discussed, a number of 
studies attempting to determine the relationship between the 
non-Bayesian approaches and the probability theory, or among 
the non-Bayesian approaches are presented. Two related 
studies are presented below. First, Grosof [1986a] compared 
Heckerman's interpretation of CF approach and DST with the 
Bayesian approach, and Heckerman's interpretation of CF 
approach with DST. 
Let O(H)= P(H)/ [1-P(H)]= P(H)/ P(-H), O(HIE)= P(HIE)/ 
[1-P(HIE)]= P(HIE)/ P(-HIE), L(H,E)= O(HIE)/ O(H), where H 
and E denote the hypothesis and an evidence, respectively. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, L(H,E) is called a 
"likelihood ratio" and represents a belief update, thus is a 
basis of Heckerman's interpretation of CF approach. Grosof 
showed that the mapping between Heckerman's interpretation 
of CF approach and the "likelihood ratio" is: C= [L-1]/[L+l] 
or L= [l+C]/[1-C], where c and L denote CF and L(H,E), 
respectively. 
Because Heckerman's interpretation of CF approach is 
developed based on the "likelihood" concept, this mapping is 
not surprising. Furthermore, the resulting mapping becomes 
obvious from the fact that c is defined as (L(H,E)-1)/ 
(L(H,E)+l)= {P(H!E)-P(H)}/{P(H)* [1-P(H!E)]+ P(H!E)* [1-
P(H)]}. C is one of the valid interpretations of 
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Heckerman's CF approach which can have an infinite number of 
valid interpretations. 
The mapping between point-valued DST (special case of 
DST) and a "likelihood ratio" L is: B= L/(L+l) or L= B/ (1-
B), where B denotes the belief function of DST. This may 
imply that DST is richer and more powerful than the 
probability theory, due to the relationship between a point 
-valued DST and L. However, the conclusion is not definite. 
The mapping between Heckerman's interpretation of CF 
approach and a point-valued DST is: B= [l+C]/2 or C= 2B-1. 
This mapping may indicate that DST is richer and more 
powerful than Heckerman's interpretation of CF approach. 
However, we cannot derive definite conclusion. 
Second, there have been a claim that DST is a 
generalization of the probability theory, because DST 
permits the representation of the interval-valued 
probability, whereas the probability theory allows a point-
valued probability. Black [1987] and Kyburg [1987] showed 
that this claim is not true. 
Kyburg [1987] showed that the belief function models 
allow a subset of closed convex probability distribution, 
i.e., not all closed convex sets of the probability 
distributions are represented in DST, contradicting the 
studies claiming that DST is a generalization of the 
probability theory. The Black's work which is an extension 
of Kyburg's work, showed many convex sets of the probability 
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distributions generates the same belief function, which 
consolidates the claim that DST is not a generalization of 
the probability theory. Black also compared Bayes' rule to 
Dempster's combining rule, and concluded that Bayes's rule 
performs better than Dempster's combining rule. 
These studies trying to determine the relationships 
among non-Bayesian approaches, and the relationships between 
non-Bayesian approaches and the probability theory, do not 
produce the results which are consistent enough to derive 
the definite conclusions. Thus, Several researchers 
including Wise [1986] and Grosof [1986b] attempted to 
develop the frameworks which can be used in comparing among 
UIS' or UIS' to the probability theory. 
Wise's framework is presented below, primarily because 
the proposed simulation model is developed based on Wise's 
framework. The proposed simulation model is adopted in 
determining the type of operations performed on the 
linguistic probability. 
Buchanan and Shortliffe [1984b] who developed the CF 
approach, tried to justify the development of CF approach by 
comparing the results of CF approach to those of the 
probability theory. Of course, the conclusion was that CF 
approach performed as well as the probability theory. 
Consider the facts that the CF approach is the first non-
Bayesian approach, and that Buchanan and Shortliffe compared 
the performance of CF approach to those of the probability 
theory to justify their work. From these facts, we can 
argue that the probability theory could be a normative 
approach. 
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This argument also applied to FST. Zadeh (1986b] 
defended FST by showing five examples which cannot be dealt 
with by the ordinary (first-order) probability theory. DST 
is only non-Bayesian approach such that little attempts have 
been made to compare it to the probability theory. Thus, We 
can make the following conclusion: even though some non-
Bayesian approaches have the advantages over the probability 
theory in terms of the power of expressiveness or the amount 
of information needed, the probability theory is the only 
normative approach. 
This conclusion could lead to an argument that the 
probability theory can be used as the standard in comparing 
UIS' with each other. Wise's framework was developed 
primarily based on this argument. 
As mentioned earlier, the ordinary (first-order) 
probability theory has the limitation in its applicability, 
in that it is not powerful enough to handle the 
"generalized" input, e.g., "it will probably rain tomorrow." 
on the other hand, although the second-order probability 
theory offers all the advantages of the Bayesian approach 
and is shown to be powerful to handle any kind of input by 
the researchers including Cheeseman (1986], it has the 
following major drawbacks. 
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First, the second-order probability distribution may 
not be obtainable in the real world applications given the 
amount of available information. In fact, simply forming a 
first-order.probability distribution to model an expert's 
belief state is only marginally feasible, let alone a 
second-order distribution over all possible first-order 
probability distribution. Second, for the sake of argument, 
suppose that the second-order probability distribution can 
be obtainable, although it is rarely true in the real world. 
However, its exponential time complexity inhibits its use. 
Thus, Wise proposed the (first-order) probability 
theory supplemented by ME/MXE as a substitute for the 
second-order probability theory, based on the argument that 
the probability theory supplemented by ME/MXE produces the 
results that are good approximations to those produced by 
the second-order probability theory. That is, Wise showed 
that ME/MXE can be used to estimate the prior probabilities 
and to update prior probabilities with the generalized data, 
as a good approximation to the second-order probability 
theory. 
The basic goal of Wise's work is to identify the 
conditions producing significant differences in the output 
of UIS' using the experiments. The emphasis is on comparing 
the outputs, not the simplicity, explicability, or ease of 
construction of the UIS itself. The general outline of his 
framework is shown in the Figure 6. The left-hand column is 
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where ME/MXE inference is performed, while the inference of 
UIS being explored is done in the right-hand column. 
In Figure 6, P0 denotes the prior probability, P1 
denotes the posterior probability. R* denotes the converted 
* * rules, D denotes the converted data. P1 denotes the output 
obtained from UIS, and P,' denotes the transformed 
probability from the output obtained from UIS'. The prior 
probabilities are estimated using ME, provided that a 
collection of rules. The posterior probabilities are 
estimated using MXE provided that the prior probabilities 
and a collection of specific facts. 
In Figure 6, the "conversion" denotes the 
transformation of belief measure of the non-Bayesian 
approaches to the probability, or the transformation of the 
probability to belief measure of non-Bayesian approaches. 
In the case of UIS, a rule set is converted into an 
appropriate form for the specific UIS and a fact set is also 
converted into the suitable form. 
Wise (1986] introduced the conversion scheme between 
UIS' and the probability theory. His conversion scheme 
between FST and the probability theory is: probability= 
fuzzy membership function. Suppose that X= {0.1/1, 0.3/3, 
0.5/5, 0.7/7, 0.9/9}. In his conversion scheme, P(X=l)= 
0.1, P(X=3}= 0.3, P(X=5}= 0.5, P(X=7}= 0.7, and P(X=9)= 0.9. 
The proposed conversion scheme between CF and the 
probability theory is: (l} CF= 1 => P(X)= 1, P(X'}= o; (2) 
CF= 0 => P(X)= P(X'); and (3) CF= -1 => P(X)= O, P(X')= 1. 
Values between these three points are computed by a 
piecewise linear interpolation. 
Maximum 
Entropy 
> L____. ~rs ion 
Data 1--> I Conversion 1-> I I Prior 
Po D I I I I D* I 
'"----'I 
Minimum 
Entropy 
I 
.j. 
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P1 I 
.j. 
Compare 
.j. 
GJ 
I 
\ 
<-- P1 I .! <----- \Conversion 
Figure 6. Basic Experiment Design for Comparisons 
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After the belief measure of non-Bayesian approach is 
transformed into the probability, the measures of error such 
as mean absolute error, mean squared error, normalized mean 
absolute error, and normalized mean squared error, are 
computed for each non-Bayesian approach. Obviously the non-
Bayesian approach with the minimum error is regarded as the 
best non-Bayesian approach. 
A question can arise as to the use of normalized mean 
absolute error and normalized mean squared error. The 
reasons for their use are presented below [Wise and Henrion, 
1986]. A difficulty can arise in comparing performance on 
different cases in that they are likely to allow different 
ranges of error. 
For example, if we randomly guess at the probability of 
0.5, it is impossible to be off by more than 0.5, but if we 
guess the probability of an almost certain event 
(probability O or 1), then it is possible to be off by 
almost 1. Thus, an error near 0.5 is almost the worst 
possible in the former case, but is about average for the 
second. 
The worst possible error of the probability is max(P,1-
P), while the error of random guess probability can be 
defined as the expected error, if the estimates of the 
probabilities are uniformly distributed over the estimated 
domain. For FST, the domain is the close interval [0,1], 
while for CF approach, the domain is the closed interval [-
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-1,1). 
For FST, the expected mean absolute error, µ(!ti), and 
the expected mean squared error, µ(1 2) are: µ(!ti)= 1/2-
P(l-P); and µ(t 2)= 1/3- P(l-P). Similarly, µ(!ti) 'sand 
µ(1 2) 's for the CF approach and DST can also be derived. 
The normalized absolute error is defined as follows: §= 
1, iff I= O; §= o, iff t= µ(!ti); and§= -1, iff t= max(P,1-
P). Similarly, the normalized squared error, ry is defined 
as: ry= 1, iff I= o; ry= o, iff t= µ(t 2); and ry= -1, iff t= 
max(P2 , (l-P) 2). Thus, the normalized measures rescale the 
errors to give 1 for zero error, O when it is as good as 
random guessing, and -1 for the worst possible error, with a 
linear interpolation in between. 
Operations on Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Number 
The operations performed on fuzzy set and a fuzzy 
number are presented here mainly because one of the problems 
which the proposed approaches deal with is the determination 
of the type of operations performed on the linguistic 
probability. The basic operations performed on fuzzy sets 
are as follows: equal, contained, union, intersection, 
complement, product, bounded sum, bounded difference, left-
square, convex combination, and Cartesian product. 
A fuzzy number is a fuzzy subset of real numbers. Its 
example is "very close to 5 11 that could be defined as 
{0.6/1, 0.7/2, 0.8/3, 0.9/4, 1/5, 0.9/6}. The operations 
1 
0 
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performed on the fuzzy numbers are: inverse, scalar, 
multiplication, exponential, absolute value, extended 
addition, extended multiplication, extended substraction, 
extended division, extended max, extended min, and extended 
power function (Dubois and Prade, 1980a]. 
Dubois and Prade (1980a] introduced a general algorithm 
for the computation of operations on fuzzy numbers. Any 
continuous fuzzy set can be decomposed into the union of 
convex fuzzy sets whose membership functions are either 
strictly increasing or decreasing or constant. In Figure 7, 
the increasing set is {T1 , T4 }, the decreasing set is {T5 }, 
and the constant set is {T2 , T3 , T6 }, where a fuzzy set shown 
in Figure 7 represents a fuzzy number. 
T2 
TS 
T1 T4 
T6 
x 
Figure 7. An Example of 
a Fuzzy Set 
The general algorithm consists of the following four 
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steps: 
Step 1 (Flattening): Then fuzzy sets are changed into fuzzy 
sets all having the same height. The height of a fuzzy set 
is the maximum membership value. 
Step 2 (Decomposition of each fuzzy set into two sets, 
namely, the set of nondecreasing parts and the set of 
nonincreasing parts): The constant parts between two 
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) ones belong to the 
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) set. The constant parts, 
which are between parts of different kinds, belong to both. 
Step 3 (Operation *"): The operation * 0 is performed for 
parts belonging to the same kind of sets. 
Step 4 (Union): The union of fuzzy sets obtained in step 3 
is the final result. 
The operation *" represents any operation performed on fuzzy 
numbers. 
Suppose that we want to add a fuzzy number A to a fuzzy 
number B shown in Figure 8. A fuzzy number A consists of 
three parts, i.e., A1 , A2 , and A3 , and a fuzzy number B 
consists of three parts, i.e., B1 , B2 , and~· In a fuzzy 
number A, the nondecreasing set is {A1 ,A2 } and the 
nonincreasing set is {A2,A3}, whereas in a fuzzy number B, 
the nondecreasing set is {B1 ,B2 } and the nonincreasing set 
is {B2 ,~}. A2 and B2 can belong to both the nondecreasing 
set and nonincreasing set, because it lies between the parts 
of the different kind of sets. 
1 
0 
1 
0 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 14 
Figure a. Fuzzy Number A and B 
Let +• denote the addition of fuzzy numbers. Also let 
cij represent the sum of two parts A; and Bj denoted A; + • Bj. 
The following C;/s are calculated: c11= A1 +· B1 ; c12= A1 +· 
B2 ; C21= A2 +• B1 ; C22= A2 +• B2 ; C23= A2 +• B3 ; C32= A3 +• B2 ; 
and c33= A3 + • B3 • The result of the addition of these fuzzy 
numbers is shown in Figure 9. 
·-' 
5 1 0 1 5 
Figure 9. Sum of Fuzzy Numbers A and B 
20 
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Suppose that two fuzzy numbers M1 and M2 are as 
follows with w, < W2 < W3: M,= w,/p,+ W2/P2+ W3/P3+ W2/P4+ w,/Ps 
and M2= w1/q1+ w2/q2+ w3/q3+ w2/~+ w1/q5• Then the result of 
any operation performed on two fuzzy numbers M1 and ~ is: M1 
where * denotes any arithmetic operation on {ordinary) 
numbers. 
The results of some operations on fuzzy numbers M1 and 
M2 are provided below: 
{ 1) inverse of M1: 
M1-1= w1/{l/p1)+ w2/{l/p2)+ w3/{1/p3)+ w2/{l/p4)+ w1/{1/p5) 
(2) scalar multiplication: 
{ 3) extended addition of M1 and M2: 
M1 + 0 ~= W1/ {p,+q1) + W2/ {p2+q2) + Wy {p3+q3) + W2/ {p4+~) + 
w,/ {p5+q5) 
(4) extended multiplication of M1 and M2: 
M, X0 M2= w,/{p,*q,)+ W2/{P2*q2)+ W3/(P3*q3)+ W2/{P4*~)+ 
w,/ (Ps*qs) 
( 5) extended subs traction of M1 from M2: 
M2 -· M,= w,/ ( q,-p,) + W2/ ( q2-p2) + W3/ ( q3-P3) + W2/ ( ~ -p4) + w,/ ( qs-Ps) 
(6) extended division of M1 by M2: 
M, + 0 M2= w,/(p,/q,)+ W2/CP2/q2)+ Wy(P3/q3)+ 
W2/ (p~~) +w,/ (P5/q5) 
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Existing Approaches to Linguistic Approximation 
Several approaches have been developed for a linguistic 
approximation. A linguistic approximation is the process of 
finding a label whose meaning is the same or the closest to 
the meaning of an unlabelled fuzzy set generated by the 
computational model. For example, a fuzzy set {0.3/0.2, 
0.4/0.4, 0.5/0.6, 0.8/0.9} could be labelled as "more or 
less true" or "very true." 
Note that one of the fundamental problems encountered 
by adopting the linguistic probability instead of ordinary 
probability is a linguistic approximation. Wenstop [1980], 
Eshragh and Mamdani [1979], Bonissone and Decker [1986], and 
Bonissone [1979] have developed the procedures for a 
linguistic approximation. These existing approaches are 
presented first followed by the discussion of a proposed 
approach. 
Wenstop's Approach 
Wenstop's procedure was the first approach introduced 
for a linguistic approximation. Wenstop considered two 
parameters of a fuzzy set, that is, its imprecision and its 
location, where the imprecision of a fuzzy set is defined as 
the sum of membership values and the location is defined as 
the mean. Fifty-six linguistic values (or labels) were 
chosen which lie approximately evenly spread out in a 
location-imprecision coordinate system. Some of the 
linguistic values are shown in Figure 10. 
degree 
of 
impre- *(low) 
sion 
*(unknown) 
*(medium) *(high) 
location 
Figure 10. An illustration of 
Wenstop's approach 
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The selection of these two parameters was based not on 
a theoretical consideration but on a intuitive appeal. The 
label which has the shortest distance to X is chosen as the 
best label of a fuzzy set x. His approach requires the 
following condition to be satisfied: fuzzy sets should be 
regular, i.e., normal, unimodal and rather steep sided. 
A fuzzy set X is called normal if its height is 1; 
otherwise it is subnormal. The height of a fuzzy set X is 
the supremum of f(X), where f(X) denotes its membership 
function. For example, a fuzzy set defined as {0.1/1, 
0.5/5, 0.9/10} is subnormal, because its height is 0.9, 
whereas a fuzzy set defined as {0.1/1, 0.5/5, 1/1} is 
normal. If a fuzzy set has a unique value of element at 
which the membership function attains its maximum, a fuzzy 
set is called unimodal. If the fuzzy set input is not 
regular, then the appropriate procedures are applied to it 
before the procedure for a linguistic approximation is 
applied. He implemented this system in APL language. 
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Wenstop's approach has several drawbacks. First, the 
number of the linguistic values and their labels are 
predetermined, thus it lacks in the flexibility from the 
users' point of view. Second, the selection of two 
parameters does not have a strong basis, rather it is based 
on a intuitive appeal. Finally, the required condition that 
a fuzzy set is regular may be too strong to be satisfied in 
real world applications, thus restricts its applicability. 
Furthermore, a procedure developed to convert unregular 
fuzzy set into a regular fuzzy set is not good enough to 
offset its limitations. Although his approach has several 
weaknesses, we should give him a credit for a pioneering 
work in a linguistic approximation. 
Eshragh and Mamdani's Approach 
In their approach, the labels are made up of a 
combination of predetermined linguistic terms and 
appropriate logical connectives "AND" and/or "OR." Thus, 
the linguistic terms are formed by combining the hedges (or 
modifiers) and linguistic terms (or primary subsets) 
provided by the users. The hedges used in their system are: 
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"not," "very," "indeed," "more or less," "above," and 
"below." 
The assignment of a linguistic label to a fuzzy set is 
achieved by labelling its segments comprising a fuzzy set. 
Then the labels obtained for the segments are appropriately 
concatenated to form a linguistic statement using 
connectives "AND" and "OR." Unlike Wenstop's approach, this 
approach does neither require normality nor restrict the 
number of primary subsets and their labels allowed. 
They developed a heuristic search program called "LAM5" 
finding the best label for an unlabelled set. The procedure 
to find the best label consists of three steps: (1) a 
generator; (2) a search procedure; and (3) an evaluation 
method. At step 1, the primary subsets provided by the user 
are arranged so that the first and last primary subsets are 
s-type and the rest are II-Type. s-type includes s··set and 
s+-set, where s-type and II-types are shown in Figure 11. 
-S - SET II-SET S+-SET 
Figure 11. s-type and 
II-type 
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The hedges are combined with the primary subsets to 
construct a set of labels. The subsets associated with 
these labels are represented using the three parameters: a, 
p, r, where a, p, and T are points in the universe of 
discourse at which the membership function attains o, 0.5, 
and 1, respectively. This three parameter representation 
for each label is then stored permanently in a back up file. 
The second step is a search procedure consisting of two 
phases. The first phase is an exhaustive search. If a 
given subset has the similar parametric representation to 
those of primary or negated primary subsets, then it will be 
tested for a perfect match. If a perfect match occurs, then 
the search is terminated and the second phase is avoided. 
Otherwise, the second phas·e is activated. In the second 
phase, the input is decomposed into a number of segments, 
and parameters of a given segment are found. 
In the third step, i.e., an evaluation phase, first, we 
locate all the labels, among those labels stored in file, 
which have the same a, p, and r values as the unlabelled 
set. When the first of such labels is found, before any 
attempt is made in finding the next one, the distance 
between the relevant section of subset represented by that 
label and the segment under test, is computed using the 
least squares method. If the distance is zero, then that 
label is accepted as the label for that segment, and the 
,evaluation phase is terminated. Otherwise, the distance is 
noted. If this distance is smaller than the previous one, 
the .new label is considered as a more suitable one and 
replaces any one previously found. 
Their approach is more sophisticated than Wenstop's 
approach for the reasons listed below: 
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(1) It allows the users to choose their own primary subsets 
and their labels. This is a significant improvement due to 
its flexibility with regard to the selection of primary 
subsets and their labels. 
(2) This approach employs the hedges which increase the 
level of granularity. 
(3) It employs the three-parameter representation for each 
primary subset, i.e, a, ~' and r. 
On the other hand, the drawbacks of their approach are 
shown below. First, the fact that it allows users to choose 
the primary subsets and their labels can be a weakness as 
well as an advantage. The selection of primary subsets 
affects the output generated by the system significantly. 
For instance, a term (or label) "likely" could be defined 
as {0.1/0.l, 0.5/0.5, 0.9/0.9} or {0.2/0.1, 0.6/0.5, 
1.0/0.9}. 
The output generated by a system can be affected by 
which fuzzy set represents a term "likely." Thus, the 
flexibility regarding the selection of the primary subsets, 
in fact, can pose the problem to some extent. This leads to 
an argument that the selection of the labels and primary 
subsets should has a theoretical basis like a parametric 
representation introduced by Bonissone and Decker [1986]. 
Second, Eshragh and Mamdani used the three-parameter 
representation for each primary subset and its label. 
However, this representation may not be good enough to 
represent the entire distribution, because this 
representation does not contain the information about the 
segment between a and p, or between p and r. The 
representation which employs the parameters including the 
mean, a variance, and the skewness could be better than 
[a,p,r] representation. In fact, Bonissone [1979] adopted 
this approach by using four parameters including the mean 
and skewness. 
Bonissone's Approach 
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Bonissone [1979] introduced an approach based on the 
feature selection and pattern recognition. He identified 
four parameters to represent the linguistic values: the 
power, entropy, first moment, and skewness. These four 
features were selected after several experiments looking for 
an efficient representation. Since an infinite number of 
features including the mean, a variance, and the skewness 
are available, we need to find a limited number of features 
to represent the linguistic values efficiently. 
The power of a fuzzy set is defined as the sum of the 
membership values. For example, the power of a fuzzy set A= 
{0.1/0.2, 0.5/0.6, 0.9/1} is 1.5 (=0.1+ 0.5+ 0.9). The 
fuzzy entropy of a fuzzy set A is defined as: 
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Entropy(A)= Ei S(µA(ui)), where S(X)= -(X*Ln X)- (1-X)*Ln(l-
X). The first moment indicates the center of the 
probability distribution and the skewness is a measure of 
asymmetry of the distribution with respect to its mean. 
The moments are defined as follows (Mood et at., 1963]: 
If X is a random variable, the rth moment of X is defined as 
E(Xr), where E denotes the expectation, if the expectation 
exists. similarly, if X is a random variable, the rth 
(central) moment of X about a is defined as E[(X-a)r]. The 
first moment of X, i.e., E(X) is the mean of X and the third 
moment aboutµ denoted E([X-µ) 3 ] is the skewness of x. 
Figure 12 shows the positive and negative skewness, 
where a curve shaped like f 1 (X) is said to be skewed to the 
left (or a negative skewness), whereas one shaped like f 2 (X) 
is said to be skewed to the right (or a positive skewness). 
Figure 12. Positive and negative skewness 
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Bonissone's search procedure consists of two steps: (1) 
The first step consists in prescreening the term set; and 
(2) The second step determines a modified Bhattacharyya 
distance between the distribution of the unlabelled set and 
the distribution of each of these preselected labels. Then 
the label of a fuzzy set with a minimum modified 
Bhattacharyya distance is selected as the best label. 
The goal of the first step, namely, the prescreening 
process is to reduce a search space. This is achieved by 
evaluating the four parameters (or features) of the 
unlabelled fuzzy set and by using a weighted Euclidean 
distance in the feature space followed by selecting the 
terms in a term set whose weighted Euclidean distance is 
within a desired tolerance level. Thus, the first step 
selects the terms such that the weighted Euclidean distance 
* * d (A, A ) <= E, where A and A denote the term set and 
unlabelled set, respectively and E denotes an acceptable 
tolerance level. 
The weighted Euclidean distance d is defined as: 
d(A,A')= p:::i wi (Pi -Pi) 2 ] 0•5 , where A and A' are fuzzy sets, 
wi's are the weights assigned to four parameters. The w;'s 
can be obtained from the user indirectly by means of 
pairwise comparison tests. The Bhattacharyya distance is 
defined as: d(pA(u),Pe(u))= -Ln R, where R is called the 
Bhattacharyya coefficient. R is defined as: R(pA,Pe)= ~i 
pA (u;) * Pe (u;} ] 112 , where pA (ui) and Pe (u;) denote the 
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membership function of the fuzzy set A and B, respectively. 
For example, if A= {O.l/0.2, 0.5/0.6, 0.8/0.9} and B= 
{0.3/0.2, 0.6/0.6, 0.9/0.9}, then d(A,B)= - Ln ((O.l*0.3+ 
0.5*0.6+ 0.8*0.9) 0•5]. However, Bonissone argued that since 
this measure does not satisfy the triangle inequality, 
therefore it is not a metric. Instead, Bonissone defined a 
modified Bhattacharyya distance satisfying all the axioms of 
a metric: d(p1 ,p2)= (1- R(p,,p2 ) ] 0•5 • 
The procedure to determine W;'s, namely, the weights 
assigned to four parameters is presented next. Yager (1977] 
showed that a method developed by Saaty can be applied to 
the determination of the wi's. Thus, Saaty's procedure is 
described below (Yager, 1977]. Assume we have P objects and 
we want to construct a scale rating of these objects as to 
their importance with respect to a certain criterion. We 
ask the decision-maker to compare the objects in a paired 
comparison. 
When an object i is compared with another object j, the 
following values aij and aji are assigned: ( 1) a;j= 1/aji; and 
(2) if i is more important than j, we assign a number to aij 
from Table 4 (Yager, 1977]. Having obtained a;j's, a P x P 
matrix B is constructed so that (1) bii=l; (2) b;j= aij' i 
!=j; and (3) bj;= 1/bij" Saaty showed that the eigenvector 
corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of a matrix B 
indicates the importance of P objects. 
In the problem of finding values of a scalar parameter 
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r for which there exist vectors x !=O satisfying AX= rx, 
where A is a given N X N matrix, the values of r are called 
the "eigenvalues" and the vectors X !=O which satisfy AX= rx 
are called "eigenvectors" of the matrix A [Hadley, 1961]. 
Because a computer program to compute the eigenvector 
corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of a given matrix is 
not straightforward, it is listed in Appendix A. 
TABLE 4 
LISTING OF INDEXES REPRESENTING 
THE IMPORTANCE 
Intensity of importance Definition 
1 Equal importance 
3 Weak importance of one over the other 
5 strong importance of one over the other 
7 Demonstrated importance of one over the other 
9 absolute importance of one over the other 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values: believe two adjacent judgement 
Suppose three people X, Y, and Z are being rated on a 
scale as to their importance to an organization [Yager, 
1979]: 
Y is weakly more important than X 
z is somewhere between equal and 
A12= 1/3, A21 = 3 
A13= 1/2 I A31= 2 
and weakly more important than X 
Y is weakly more important than Z. ~3= 3, A32= 1/3. 
Then the matrix B becomes: 
x y z 
B- ~ D i/3 ;11~ 1/3 J 
We then need to solve the eigenvalue problem BX= rmax 
X, where r~x is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix B and 
compute the eigenvector corresponding to omax· In this 
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example, W= (0.16 0.59 T 0.25) . This result indicates that 
the importance of three people X, Y, and z to an 
organization are 0.16, 0.59, and 0.25, respectively. 
Bonissone's scheme has several strengths and 
weaknesses, especially comparing to Eshragh and Mamdani's 
scheme. The advantages are discussed first, followed by the 
discussion of the disadvantages. First, it adopts four 
features, namely, power, entropy, first moment, and skewness 
to represent each subset. It seem that this representation 
is better than Eshragh and Mamdani's scheme. 
Second, it adopts the prescreening process to reduce a 
search space. As the terms employed increase, the 
prescreening process will play an important role in reducing 
the search time. Third, it developed a modified 
Bhattacharyya distance which is a good metric. on the other 
hand, it has a drawback in that it does not employ the 
1 
0 
hedges, whereas the hedges are adopted in Eshragh and 
Mamdani's approach. 
Parametric Representation of Linguistic Probability 
Bonissone and Decker [1986] presented a parametric 
representation of the linguistic probability. This 
parametric representation is achieved by the 4-tuple 
(a,b,a,fi), where the first two parameters indicate the 
interval in which the membership value is 1.0, whereas the 
third and fourth parameters indicate the left and right 
width of the distribution, respectively. Its membership 
distribution is shown in Figure 13. 
a-a a b b+fi 
Figure 13. A parametric 
representation 
[a,b,a,fi] 
As discussed earlier, Eshragh and Mamdani introduced 
the parametric representation achieved by 3-tuple [a,fi,r]. 
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Both parametric representations introduced by Bonissone and 
Decker, and Eshragh and Mamdani have the advantage in that 
they are computationally efficient ways to characterize the 
linguistic probability. Now the question as to which 
parametric representation needs to be addressed. The 
parametric representation achieved by 4-tuple (a,b,a,~] is 
better than the parametric representation achieved by 3-
tuple [a,~ 1 r] for the following reasons. 
First of all, 4-tuple representation (a,b,a,~] does 
represent the entire membership function better than 3-tuple 
representation [a,~ 1 T], simply because it has one more 
parameter. on the other hand, it can be argued that 3-tuple 
representation is better than 4-tuple representation in 
terms of the memory requirement. However, as long as the 
number of the linguistic values employed by the system are 
of reasonable size, the issue of memory requirement is of 
little concern. 
Furthermore, the 4-tuple representation is the only 
representation which is based on the results of 
psychological experiments on the use of linguistic 
probabilities (Beyth-Marom, 1966]. Note that the membership 
function of a fuzzy set affects the output significantly. 
Proposed Approaches 
Because Pearl's algorithms use the probability as the 
measure of the belief, the determination of the conditional 
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probability distributions of the links and the prior 
probability distribution of the root node need to be 
determined in advance before Pearl's algorithms are applied. 
The precision inherent in the probabilities affects the 
precision of the belief of a node of interest to a great 
extent. 
The main problem with Pearl's algorithms is how 
accurately users/experts can determine the prior probability 
distribution and conditional probability distributions. 
Several researchers including Szolovits and Pauker argued 
that when users/experts must provide these measures, an 
assumption of "fake precision" must usually be made. 
Szolovits and Pauker [1978] noted that 
11 
••• while people seem quite prepared to give qualitative 
estimates likelihood, they are often notoriously unwilling 
to give precise numerical estimates to outcomes." 
Therefore, they argued that any scheme that relies on 
the user providing consistent and precise numerical 
quantifications of the confidence level of his/her 
conditional or unconditional statements is bound to fail. 
For example, in response to the question "how much does the 
report on u.s. trade deficit in January 1989 affect the 
stock market in March 1989?", the expert may feel more 
comfortable with providing an answer of "very likely" rather 
than 80 percent. 
For the sake of argument, suppose that accurate values 
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of the probabilities are obtainable from the users/experts 
in the actual applications, although it will be rarely true 
primarily due to an assumption of "fake precision." Pearl's 
algorithms can rectify the error inherent in the prior 
probability distribution by updating it, in a time 
proportional to the longest path in the network. Because 
the time it takes to update the prior probability 
distribution is proportional to constant, i.e., the longest 
path in the network, the problem due to an inaccurate 
estimation of the prior probability distribution is not 
significant enough to justify the use of linguistic 
probabilities instead of the probability. 
However, the problem with the estimation of conditional 
probability distributions may be significant enough to 
justify the use of linguistic probabilities. For example, 
suppose that thirty rules need to be applied to compute the 
belief of one proposition of interest. Also suppose that 
the longest path in the network is 50. When there is an 
error in one conditional probability distribution associated 
with one link, its impact can be updated in a time 
proportional to 50. Note that there is the conditional 
probability distribution associated with each link. 
Suppose that there are errors in all thirty conditional 
probability distributions. This is likely to occur 
especially if we adopt the definition of probability as a 
measure of belief. The definition of probability as a 
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measure of belief was favored by a number of researchers 
including Cheeseman who have strongly defended the 
probability theory. In this definition of probability, the 
probability is a (subjective) measure of an entity's belief 
in that proposition given the evidence. 
The time required to impart the impacts to all nodes 
becomes proportional to 1,500 (=50*30). We can imagine how 
much time is required in the propagation scheme, if one 
hundred rules need to be applied. Although the time 
required is proportional to constant, i.e., the longest path 
of the network, the updating time gets huge as the number of 
rules employed by the system increases. Furthermore, note 
that this argument is based on the unrealistic assumption 
that the accurate values of probabilities are obtainable. 
The major advantages of using the linguistic 
probabilities is presented below. Phillips and Edwards 
(1966] observed the conservatism which is consistently 
present among the suppliers of subjective assessments, when 
dealing with subjective assessment of the probability. The 
behavior in which people tend to stick to the original (a 
priori) assessment regardless df new amount of evidence that 
should cause a revision of their belief, is called observed 
conservatism. 
Zinimer (,1985] performed an experiment to compare the 
linguistic probabilities with numerical probabilities to 
determine if the observed conservatism in the belief 
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revision was a phenomenon intrinsic in the perception of the 
events or due to the type of representation (i.e., numerical 
rather than verbal expressions). The results indicated that 
people are much closer to the optimal Bayesian revision when 
they are allowed to use linguistic probabilities. 
The proposed algorithms adopt the linguistic 
probability instead of the (ordinary) probability, where 
"likely," "unlikely," "probable," and "very probable" are 
the examples of linguistic probability. The linguistic 
probability is defined as a fuzzy subset of [0,1]. For 
instance, linguistic probability "likely" could be defined 
as {0.3/0.6, 0.5/0.7, 0.7/0.8, 0.9/0.9, 1/1}. 
For illustrative purposes, the following example is 
used throughout this section to contrast Pearl's algorithm 
for a tree structure to the proposed algorithm for a tree 
structure: 
(example) Assume that in a certain trial there are three 
suspects, one of whom has definitely committed a murder, and 
that the murder weapon showing some fingerprints, was later 
found by the police. Let A stand for the identity of the 
last user of the weapon, namely, the killer. Let B stand 
for the identity of the last holder of the weapon, i.e., the 
person whose finger prints were left on the weapon. Let C 
represent the possible readings that may be obtained in a 
fingerprint-testing laboratory. 
A 
I 
.i. 
B 
I 
I 
I 
.i. 
c 
Figure 14. Example of the Network Diagram 
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A tree diagram of this example is shown in Figure 14. 
The arc from node A to node B contains the conditional 
probability distribution P(BIA). The node c is a dummy node 
and is indicated by a dotted link. Suppose that P(BIA) is: 
-0.8 if A; =Bj I i, j= 1,2,3 
P(Bj IA;)= I 
Lo.l if A; 1-B i, j= 1,2,3 • - j I 
or stated another way 
B, Bz ~ 
r- -, 
A1 0.8 0.1 0.1 
\ P(BIA)= Az 0.1 0.8 0.1 A3 0.1 0.1 0.8 L _J 
In the matrix P(BIA), three rows represent A1 , Az, and 
A3 , respectively, where A; denotes an event that the 
identify of the murderer is the ith suspect. Similarly, 
three columns represent B1 , B2 , and ~' respectively, where 
B; denotes an event that the last holder of weapon is the 
ith suspect. 
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Also suppose that P(BIC) is (1 1 1), because the 
laboratory report is not available at this moment. P(BIC)= 
(1 1 1) means that if the laboratory report indicates that 
the fingerprint of the ith suspect is found on the weapon, 
then the ith suspect is the last holder of the weapon with 
certainty. Let us assume that the prior probability 
distribution of node A is (0.8 0.1 0.1). This implies 
that the probability the first suspect is a murderer is 0.8, 
while the probability the second or third suspect is a 
murderer is 0.1. 
Pearl's algorithm and a proposed algorithm are 
presented below, where Pearl's algorithm is shown in the 
left-hand side and a proposed algorithm is shown in the 
right-hand side. Note that the linguistic probabilities are 
chosen arbitrarily for illustrative purposes. Also note 
denote the resulting vectors obtained from the relevant 
operations. 
P(BIA)= ~-8 0.1 
0.1 0.8 
0.1 0.1 
o.~ 0 1 
0.8 
~(A)= (0.8 0.1 0.1) 
P(BIA)= ~ikely unlikely unlikely] 
unlikely likely unlikely 
unlikely unlikely likely 
~(A)=(likely unlikely unlikely) 
(B: an anticipatory node before obtaining any fingerprint 
information) 
o(B)= (1 1 1) o(B)=(certain certain certain) 
(o8 (A): message sent from a node B to a node A) 
o8 (A)= o(B)* P(BIA)= o8 (A)=(certain certain certain) 
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(1 1 1) [0.8 0.1 o] ~ikely unlikely unlikel~ 0.1 0.8 0.1 nlikely likely unlikely 
0.1 0.1 0.8 nlikely unlikely likely 
= (1 1 1) =(Al A2 A3) 
(B: only child node of node A) 
o (A)= 08 (A)= ( 1 1 1) o(A)= o8 (A)= (Al A2 A3) 
(Computation of the belief of node A) 
BEL(A)= a* o(A)* ~(A)= BEL(A)= a* o(A)*~(A)= (Al A2 A3)* 
(1 1 l)* (0.8 0.1 0.1) (likely unlikely unlikely) 
= (0.8 0.1 0.1) 
(~8 (A): message sent from node A to node B): top-down 
propagation 
~8 (A)= a'* BEL(A)/o8 (A) ~8 (A)= a'* BEL(A)/ o8 (A) 
= a'* (0.8 0.1 0.1)/ 
(1 1 l)= (0.8 0.1 0.1) 
(~(B): support attributed to B by its parent node) 
~(B)= /3* ~8 (A)* P(B!A) 
= /3* (0.8 0.1 0 .1) 
~-8 0.1 o.~ .1 0.8 0 1 
.1 0.1 0.8 
= (0.66 0.17 0.17) 
~ikely unlikely unlikely] nlikely likely unlikely 
nlikely unlikely likely 
(Computation of the belief of node B) 
BEL(B)= a* o(B)* ~(B) BEL(B)= a* (certain certain certain) 
=a* (1 1 l)* 
(0.66 0.17 0.17)= (0.66 0.17 0.17) 
(Now a laboratory report arrives and summarizes the test 
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results): 
(oc(B): message from the dummy node c to node B) 
oc (B) = o (B) oc(B)= o(B)=(very likely likely likely) 
= (0.8 0.6 0.5) 
(Updated belief of node B) 
BEL(B)= a*o(B)*~(B) BEL(B)= a*o(B)* ~(B)= a* 
= a*(0.8 0.6 0.5)* (very likely likely likely)* (D1 D2 D3> 
(0.66 0.17 0.17) 
= (0.738 0.142 0.119) 
(o8 (A): message from node B to node A): bottom-up 
propagation 
o8 (A)= o(B)* P(BIA) o8 (A)= o(B)* P(BIA)= (very likely 
= co.8 o.6 o.5) ~-8 0.1 o.~ 
0.1 0.1 0.8 
0.1 0.1 0.8 
= (0.75 0.61 0.54) 
[ 
likely likely) ] 
likely unlikely unlikely 
unlikely likely unlikely 
unlikely unlikely likely 
(B: only child node of node A) 
o (A)= 08 (A) 
(Updated belief of node A) 
BEL(A)= a*(G; G2 G3 ) (likely unlikely 
unlikely) 
BEL(A)= a* o(A)* ~(A) 
=a* (0.75 0.61 0.54)* = (H1 H2 H3 ) 
(0.8 0.1 0.1) 
= (0.839 0.085 0.076) 
(suspect Ai produces a very strong alibi in his/her favor, 
suggesting that there are only 1:10 odds that he could have 
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committed the crime. We link a dummy node E directly to A. 
E is an event producing a alibi) 
A 
' I ',, 
B E 
I 
I 
I 
c 
(oe(A): message from node E to node A) 
oe(A)= (0.1 1 1) oe(A)= (very unlikely certain 
certain) 
(o(A): support attributed to A by its child nodes) 
o (A)= oE (A)* 08 (A) o(A)= (very unlikely certain 
certain)* (G1 G2 G3)= 
= (0.1 1 1)* (0.75 0.61 0.54) (I1 I 2 I 3) 
= (0.075 0.61 0.54) 
(Updated belief of node A) 
BEL (A)= a* 0 (A) * 71' (A) BEL (A)= a* ( r, Iz I3) 
=a* (0.075 0.61 0.54)* (likely unlikely unlikely) 
(0.8 0.1 0.1) 
= (0.343 0.349 0.309) 
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(~8 (A): message from node A to node B): top-down propagation 
=a* (0.1 1 1)* 
(0.8 0.1 0.1) 
= a*(0.08 0.1 0.1) 
~8 (A)= a* (very unlikely certain 
certain)* 
(likely unlikely unlikely) 
(~(B): support attributed to B by its parent node) 
~ ( B) = /3 * ~ B (A) * p ( B I A) ~ ( B) = /3 * ( K, K2 K3) 
= 13* (0.08 0.1 0.1) 
~.8 0.1 o.~ .1 0.8 0.1 
.1 0.1 0.8 
= (0.3 0.35 0.35) 
[
likely unlikely unlikel~ 
unlikely likely unlikely 
unlikely unlikely likely 
= (L, ~ ~) 
(Updated belief of node B) 
BEL(B)= a* o(B)* ~(B)= BEL(B)= a* (very likely likely) 
a* (0.8 0.6 0.5)* likely) 
( 0 • 3 0 • 3 5 0 . 3 5) = ( L1 ~ ~) = ( M1 M2 M3 ) 
= (0.384 0.336 0.28) 
After updating the belief of node B, the propagation scheme 
is terminated. 
There are two fundamental problems with the proposed 
approach. The first problem is to determine the types of 
operations performed on the linguistic probabilities. The 
second problem is to find a label of an unlabelled set 
generated by the computational model. 
Regarding the operations performed on the linguistic 
probabilities, we need to resolve several problems presented 
below. First, we need to determine whether or not the sum 
101 
of the linguistic probabilities equals 1. In the example 
given above, for instance, the question is whether the sum 
of elements in the first row of matrix P(BIA), i.e., likely+ 
unlikely+ unlikely equals 1, whereas the sum of the 
probabilities of all possible events should be 1 in the 
probability theory. 
Second, we need to determine how to handle the 
multiplication of matrices whose elements are linguistic 
probabilities. This is reflected in the computation of the 
row vector (A1 A2 A3 ) in the example given above. Third, 
we need to determine how to handle the product of two 
linguistic probabilities. This is reflected in the 
computation of the row vector (B1 B2 ~) in the example 
given above. Finally, we need to determine how to handle 
the division of one linguistic probability by another 
linguistic probability. This is shown in the computation of 
the vector (C1 c2 C3) in the example given above. 
The second fundamental question is to find a label of 
an unlabelled set. For example, we could label B1 as 
"likely." The process of finding a label of an unlabelled 
set is called a linguistic approximation. In the proposed 
algorithms employing the linguistic probabilities, we do not 
attempt to modify Pearl's algorithms, but attempt to resolve 
the problems associated with using the linguistic 
probabilities. 
These two fundamental problems also occur in a propose 
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algorithm for the network structure. The next two sections 
deal with these two problems, where the first problem is 
discussed first followed by the discussion of the second 
problem, namely, a linguistic approximation. 
Interpretations of Linguistic Probabilities 
The issue of determining the types of operations 
performed on the linguistic probabilities is the kernel of 
the proposed algorithms, because research is scarce in the 
literature regarding this problem. On the other hand, 
several approaches [Bonissone, 1979; Bonissone and Decker, 
1986; Eshragh and Mamdani, 1979; Wenstop, 1980] have been 
developed. in regard to a linguistic approximation. 
When these algorithms were initiated, the development 
of a collection of theorems was expected to resolve this 
issue. However, after several attempts, it was concluded 
that such a theorem base was not forthcoming. It was 
decided to employ a heuristic approach. Several researchers 
including Bonissone and Decker [1986] indicated that the 
linguistic probability can be regarded as a fuzzy number. A 
fuzzy number is a fuzzy subset of real numbers, e.g., 
"approximately 0.9." Dubois and Prade [1980a] defined a 
number of operations performed on fuzzy numbers. It seems 
that an alternative approach is to treat the linguistic 
probability as the ordinary fuzzy set. A number of 
operations on fuzzy sets including union and intersection 
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have been defined by a number of researchers including Zadeh 
(1965]. 
Depending on which interpretation of the linguistic 
probability we follow, the result becomes totally different 
due to the fact that the operations defined on fuzzy numbers 
are completely different from those defined on fuzzy sets. 
In the absence of a set of theorems to determine the best 
interpretation, it seems feasible to use a simulation 
approach. The complete description of a simulation model 
will be done later in this section. 
Fuzzy Set Interpretation 
Under this interpretation, we treat the linguistic 
probability as the ordinary fuzzy set. The basic operations 
performed on fuzzy sets are as follows: equal, contained, 
union, intersection, complement, product, bounded sum, 
bounded difference, left-square, convex combination, and 
Cartesian product. In this interpretation, the sum of the 
fuzzy sets obviously needs not to be 1. For example, the 
sum of two fuzzy sets "young" and "middle-aged" needs not to 
be 1. 
As far as the multiplication of matrices consisting of 
the linguistic probabilities is concerned, It seems that a 
fuzzy matrix theory (Kim, 1982; Kim and Roush, 1980] is 
applicable. A fuzzy matrix is a matrix whose entries lie in 
[0,1]. The example of a fuzzy matrix is: 
A= [
0.6 
0.5 
o.~ 
o.~ 
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The multiplication of fuzzy matrices is defined as follows: 
A* B= [sup {inf ( aik, bkj) } ] , where a;k= element of matrix A 
k 
bkj= element of matrix B 
The other operations defined on fuzzy matrices are as 
follows: 
addition of matrices: A + B= [sup {a; i, b; j} ] 
product of scalar and matrix: cA= [inf {c,aii}], where c= a 
scalar. 
The "sup" and "inf" denote the supremum and infimum 
defined below, respectively [Pinter, 1971]. The supremum of 
a set B in a set A is defined as the least upper bound of a 
set B in a set A. The infimum of a set B in a set A is 
defined as the greatest lower bound of a set B in a set A. 
A greatest element in the class of lower bounds of a set B 
in a set A is called the greatest lower bound of a set B in 
a set A. A least element in the class of upper bounds of a 
set B in a set A is called the least upper bound of a set B 
in a set A. 
A scheme to handle the multiplication of matrices 
consisting of the linguistic probabilities is presented 
below. Because the basic operations performed on fuzzy sets 
include intersection and union, our intention is to propose 
a scheme built around these basic operations. 
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Kim and Roush [1980] showed that many results of a 
fuzzy matrix theory are valid for matrices over any 
commutative semiring. A semiring is a set R provided with 
two binary operations '+' and '*' from R X R to R, which 
satisfy the following five properties: (1) a+b= b+a; (2) a+ 
(b+c)= (a+b)+ c; (3) a* (b*c)= (a*b)* c; (4) a* (b+c)= a*b+ 
a*c; and (5) (b+c)*a=b*a+c*a. A semiring is said to be 
commutative if the law a*b= b*a holds. 
If we define '+' as union operation, i.e., F(A+B)= 
max[F(A) ,F(B)] and '*' as intersection operation, i.e., 
F(A*B)= min[F(A),F(B)], it can be easily shown that a set of 
linguistic probabilities is a commutative semiring. F 
denotes the membership function. Thus, the membership 
function of the union of A and B consists of the maximum 
values of the membership functions of A and B. On the other 
hand, the membership function of the intersection of A and B 
consists of the minimum values of the membership functions 
of A and B. 
Kim and Roush [1980] also showed the fuzzy algebra 
[0,1] under the operations a+b= sup{a,b},a*b= inf{a,b} is a 
commutative semiring. If we perform three operation on 
fuzzy matrices A1 and A2 using the operations a+b= sup{a,b} 
and a*b= inf{a,b} defined in the fuzzy algebra [0,1], we can 
obtain the following results. 
r- -, r;. 5 -, A,= lo.1 o. 2 I and A2= 0.61 ~-3 0.4J ~-1 o.~ 
(1) multiplication of A1 and A2 : 
lo .1 0. ;i lo. 5 0. ;i =lo. 1 *O. 5+0. 2 *O. 7 
~-3 o.~ ~-7 o.sj l0.3*0.5+0.4*0.7 
(2) addition of A1 and ~: 
~-1 o.~ ~-5 o.~= ~-1+ 0.5 + 
.3 0.4 .7 0.8 .3+ 0.7 
(3) product of a scalar and A1 : 
~-1 o.~= ~-5•0.1 0.5•0.~ (0.5) 
.3 0.4 0.5*0.3 0.5*0.4 
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0 .1*0. 6+0. 2*0. ;i 
· o.3*0.6+0.4*0.sj 
0.2+ o.~ 
0.4+ 0.8 
If we define '*' as the infimum and '+' as the supremum, it 
can be easily shown that the results of these three 
operations are consistent with those obtained from the 
operations performed on fuzzy matrices. 
As shown earlier, a set of the linguistic probabilities 
is a commutative semiring provided that '+' is an union 
operation and '*' is an intersection operation. The fuzzy 
algebra [0,1] under the operations a+b= sup{a,b} and a*b= 
inf{a,b} is also a commutative semiring. Since the latter 
commutative semiring produces the results which are 
identical to those obtained from the operations on fuzzy 
107 
matrices, it seems reasonable to define '+' as an union 
operation and '*' as an intersection operation for fuzzy 
matrices consisting of the linguistic probabilities. 
Thus, the multiplication of ~atrices A1 and B1 
consisting of the linguistic probabilities can be defined as 
where ai and bi denote the linguistic probabilities, and 'n' 
and 'U' denote an intersection and union operation, 
respectively. Although this argument does not fully justify 
a proposed scheme, it seems acceptable provided that no 
scheme has been developed. 
In the process of developing a proposed scheme, it is 
shown that if we define '+' as an union and '*' as an 
intersection, a set of linguistic probabilities is a 
commutative semiring. Similarly, if we define '+' as an 
intersection and '*' as an union, we can also easily show 
that a set of linguistic probabilities is also a commutative 
semiring. If we follow these latter definitions of '+' and 
'*,' the multiplication of matrices consisting of linguistic 
probabilities can be defined as follows: 
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Given the fuzzy sets A= {0.2/0.1, 0.4/0.5, 0.8/0.9} and 
B= {0.3/0.1, 0.6/0.5, 1.0/0.9}, AU B= {max(0.2,0.3)/0.1, 
max(0.4,0.6)/0.5, max(0.8,1.0)/0.9} and An B= 
{min(0.2,0.3)/0.1, min(0.4,0.6)/0.5, min(0.8,1.0)/0.9}. 
This shows that the union operation tends to increase the 
resulting membership values, while the intersection 
operation tends to decrease the resulting membership values. 
The fact that the membership values increase as a result of 
the union operation indicates that the union is a 
nondecreasing operator, whereas the intersection is a 
nonincreasing operator. 
Because Pearl's algorithms use the probability as a 
measure of belief, the numbers dealt with by his algorithms 
lie between O and 1. Thus, the addition of the 
probabilities is a nondecreasing operator, whereas the 
multiplication of the probabilities is a nonincreasing 
operator. If we simply consider how the multiplication of 
the (ordinary) matrices is performed, treating '+' and '*' 
as the union and the intersection seems to make more sense 
than the other way. The belief of node A is computed via 
the product of o(A) by ~(A). In this computation, two 
linguistic probabilities need to be multiplied. Because the 
multiplication of the probabilities and the intersection 
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operation are both nonincreasing operators, it seems 
reasonable to use the intersection operation for the product 
of two linguistic probabilities. 
The division operation on fuzzy sets needs to be 
defined in order to divide one row vector consisting of the 
linguistic probabilities by another row vector. The 
proposed scheme for this division operation is provided 
below. The division operation on matrices A and B 
consisting of the linguistic probabilities is denoted A/B 
and is defined by F(A/B)= F(A)/F(B), where F(A)= membership 
function of A and F(B)= membership function of B. 
For example, if A= {0.1/0.2, 0.3/0.4, 0.5/0.6} and B= 
(0.7/0.2, 0.8/0.4, 0.9/0.6}, A/B= {(0.1/0.7)/0.2, 
(0.3/0.8)/0.4, (0.5/0.9)/0.6}. If any of the resulting 
membership values exceeds one, a normalization is necessary. 
For instance, given A= {0.1/0.2, 0.3/0.4, 0.5/0.6} and B= 
{0.2/0.2, 0.2/0.4, 0.5/0.6}, A/B= {0.5/0.2, 1.5/0.4, 
1.0/0.6}= {(0.5/1.5)/0.2, 1.0/0.4, (1.0/1.5)/0.6}. 
Fuzzy Number Interpretation 
The second approach advocated by researchers including 
Dubois and Prade [1980a], and Bonissone and Decker [1986] is 
to treat the linguistic probability as a fuzzy number. A 
fuzzy number is a fuzzy subset of real numbers. As 
discussed earlier, the operations performed on the fuzzy 
numbers are: inverse, scalar, multiplication, exponential, 
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absolute value, extended addition, extended multiplication, 
extended substraction, extended division, extended max, 
extended min, and extended power function [Dubois and Prade, 
1980a]. 
The extended addition, extended multiplication, and 
extended division can be performed on the linguistic 
probabilities in the proposed algorithms in the same manner 
that the probabilities are manipulated in Pearl's algorithms 
via the addition, multiplication, and division. One issue 
that has not been resolved yet is how to deal with a 
normalizing constant. 
Suppose that the linguistic probabilities "unlikely," 
"maybe," and "likely" are defined as follows: 
"unlikely"= {l/0.2, 0.8/0.4, 0.6/0.6, 0.4/0.8, 0.2/1} 
"maybe"= {0.6/0/1, 0.8/0.3, 1/0.5, 0.8/0.7, 0.6/0.9} 
"likely"= {0.6/0.5, 0.8/0.6, 1/0.7, 0.8/0.8, 0.6/0.9} 
If we treat the linguistic probability as a fuzzy 
number, "unlikely," "maybe," and "likely" could be regarded 
as "approximately 0.2, 11 "approximately 0.5," and 
"approximately 0.7, 11 respectively. Thus, the sum of these 
linguistic probabilities is "approximately 0.2 11+ 
"approximately 0.5 11+ "approximately 0.7" which results in 
"approximately 1.4." This indicates that a normalizing 
constant is necessary if the linguistic probability is 
treated as a fuzzy number. 
Once we have the conclusion that a normalizing constant 
is necessary, the next question occurs as to how we 
determine a normalizing constant and how we normalize the 
linguistic probabilities. An approach to resolve this 
problem is proposed below. 
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Zadeh (1978a] argued that we can derive the probability 
distribution from a possibility distribution and Moral 
(1986] proposed the use of principle of ME in deriving the 
probability distribution from a possibility distribution. 
Zadeh's approach and Moral's approach are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3 later. A proposed approach is primarily 
built around these two approaches. 
Suppose we add two linguistic probabilities L1 and L2 
that are represented by { a 1/p1 , a 2/p2 , a 3/p3 , a 4/p4 } and { b 1/p1 , 
b2/p2 , b3/p3 , b4/p4 } , respectively. And suppose the result 
obtained from adding L1 to ~ is {w1/p1 , w2/p2 , w3/p3 , w4/P4 }. 
The first step is to determine the (second-order) 
probability distribution from this possibility distribution 
{w1/p1 , w2/p2 , w3/p3 , w4/p4 }. The resulting probability 
distribution is denoted { z 1/p1 , z 2/p2 , zyp3 , z4/p4 }, where L: 
zi= 1. The second step is to compute the mean of this 
(second-order) probability distribution, i.e., z 1*p1+ z 2*p2+ 
z3 *p3+ z4 *p4 , where the mean is denoted M. 
If M is 1, the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, we 
go to the third step performing a normalization. The third 
step performs a normalization and produces a normalized L1 
and ~ which are expressed as { a 1/ (p1/M) , a 2/ (p2/M) , 
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ay' (p3/M), a 4/ (p4/M)} and {b1/ (p1/M), b 2/ (p2/M) , b3/ (p3/M) , 
b4/ (p~M) } . In other words, in the third step, we multiply 
each second element of a fuzzy pair by (1/M). Its line of 
reasoning is provided below. 
Suppose that a fuzzy number "approximately 3 11 is 
defined as {m1/e1 , m2/e2 , m3/e3 , m4/e4 }. Another fuzzy number 
defined as {m1/ (2e1), m2/ (2e2), m3/ (2e3), m~ (2e4)} denotes a 
fuzzy number "approximately 6. 11 This can be easily shown by 
simply applying Moral's approach. 
Proposed Simulation model 
Because it has been concluded that it will not be 
possible to prove mathematically which interpretation 
performs better, the use of a simulation model seems 
acceptable to this kind of situation, even though this 
technique does not offer conclusive proof. As discussed 
earlier, Wise's framework compares the results obtained from 
the non-Bayesian approaches to that obtained from the 
probability theory supplemented by ME/MXE. 
Wise also developed the following conversion scheme 
between FST and the probability theory: probability= fuzzy 
membership value. Suppose that a fuzzy set "young" is 
defined as {1/10, 0.9/20, 0.8/30, 0.5/40}. In Wise's 
scheme, for example, the probability of "age of 20" is 0.9. 
Assuming that his scheme is correct, the. sum of the 
membership values should equal 1, because the sum of the 
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probabilities equals 1. However, in FST, the sum of the 
membership values is not necessarily equal to one. In fact, 
in this example, the sum of the membership values is 3.2 
(=l+0.9+0.8+0.5). 
It seems that Wise expected this kind of criticism on 
his conversion scheme between FST and the probability 
theory. He [p.44, Wise, 1986] noted 11 ••• the objection is 
often made that fuzzy memberships need not add to one, as 
must probabilities over an exclusive and exhaustive set of 
events. The natural reply is that they do not represent 
probabilities over an exclusive and exhaustive set-it may be 
incomplete if they add to less than 1, it is not exclusive 
if they add to more than l.O." 
FST is a generalization of the (ordinary) set theory in 
that FST allows a partial membership. In the ordinary set 
theory, for example, given a set S= {l,2,4,6}, the 
membership values of the elements {1,4,6,7} are 1 (true), 1 
(true), 1 (trtie), and o (false), respectively. Thus, the 
sum of the membership values is 3. The sum of the 
membership values in the ordinary set theory needs not to be 
one, rather can be any integer. Since FST is a 
generalization of the (ordinary) set theory, we can argue 
that the sum of the membership values needs not to be one in 
FST. In essence, it has nothing to do with "exclusive and 
exhaustive set of events." 
The probability/possibility consistency principle 
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introduced by Zadeh [1978a] is discussed first, followed by 
the presentation of a proposed mapping scheme. Zadeh 
[1978a] concluded that "Thus, a high degree of possibility 
does not imply a high degree of probability, nor does a low 
degree of probability imply a low degree of possibility. 
However, if an event is impossible, it is bound to be 
improbable." From "if an event is impossible, it is bound 
to be improbable," a possibility was interpreted as an upper 
bound of the probability, leading to the conclusion that the 
probability distribution can be derived from a possibility 
distribution, but not vice versa. 
This connection between the possibilities and the 
probabilities is called the probability/possibility 
consistency principle. After Zadeh introduced the 
probability/possibility consistency principle, researchers 
in FST have taken his conclusion regarding the 
probability/possibility consistency principle for granted. 
The possibility/probability consistency measure represents 
the degree of consistency of the probability distribution 
with a possibility distribution. 
Three measures of the probability/possibility 
consistency developed by Zadeh, Dubois and Prade, and Sugeno 
are as follows [Moral, 1986]: 
(1) Zadeh's concept: Cz(Pos,P)= ~ P(a)*pos(a), where pos= 
a€U 
possibility. 
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(2) Dubois and Prade's concept: 
c0P (pos, p) = 
r-1 
I 
if POS(A) >= P(A), A€ U 
.._o otherwise 
where POS(A)= Sup pos(a), P(A)= ~ p(a), and p= probability 
a EA a EA 
(3) Sugeno's measure: 
C5 (pos,p)= f. 
JU 
f(pos) g(p), 
0 
where f and g are non-decreasing mapping.s f,g: [0,1] -> 
[O,l] with f(O)= g(O)= o, f(l)= g(l)= 1 and Ju stands for 
Sugeno's fuzzy integral. 
In Zadeh's measure and Sugeno's measure, a higher value of 
consistency measure implies a high degree of consistency of 
the probability distribution with a possibility 
distribution, where the consistency measure does exceed 1. 
It seems that the statement "if an event is impossible, 
it is bound to be improbable" is an overstatement, in the 
sense that the rather more accurate statement could be "a 
low degree of possibility implies a low degree of 
probability." The former is a special case of the latter. 
From the statements "a high degree of possibility does not 
imply a high degree of probability." and "a low degree of 
possibility implies a low degree of probability.", we can 
conclude that there exists a weak relationship between a 
possibility distribution and the probability distribution. 
Thus, the probability distribution can be derived from 
a possibility distribution, which is in accordance with 
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Zadeh's probability/possibility consistency principle. 
Although it was not discussed by Zadeh [1978a], it makes 
sense intuitively to say that a high probability implies a 
high possibility. Two statements, namely, "a high degree of 
probability implies a high of possibility" and "a low 
probability does not imply a low possibility" indicate that 
there exists a weak relationship between the probability 
distribution and a possibility distribution. Thus, we can 
conclude that a possibility distribution can be derived from 
the probability distribution, although it is not in 
accordance with the commonly accepted statement "a 
possibility distribution cannot be derived from the 
probability distribution." 
The analytical solution in deriving the probability 
distribution from a possibility distribution from a 
possibility distribution are presented first, followed by 
the discussion of the analytical solutions in deriving a 
possibility distribution from the probability distribution. 
Moral [1986] discussed how to construct the probability 
distribution from a possibility distribution. His scheme is 
based on ME. 
The resulting probability distribution is the solution 
of the following non-LP problem: 
Maximize H= -K ~ P(a)* ln(P(a)) 
aeu 
s.t. 
~ P(a)= 1 
aeu 
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"P is consistent with possibility," where K= constant and 
P= probability. Any of three probability/possibility 
consistency measures can be substituted into the constraint 
"P is consistent with possibility." 
The above non-LP problem is a fuzzy non-LP problem, 
because the constraint "P is consistent with possibility" is 
fuzzy. Especially if Zadeh's measure or Sugeno's measure is 
used, the constraint "P is consistent with possibility" is 
fuzzy, because the higher a, the more "P is more consistent 
with possibility." a represents the measure of 
probability/possibility consistency. On the other hand, the 
use of Dubois and Prade's measure results in a crisp (or 
non-fuzzy) non-LP problem. The fuzzy non-LP problem has the 
limitation in that its computational time is prohibitive. 
Thus, Verdegay proposed an approach to solve the a-cut 
of the original problem shown below: 
Max: H= -KL P(a)*ln(P(a)) 
a€U 
s.t. L P(a)= 1 
a€U 
C (7r, P) >= a 
(1) 
where a € [O,l], C(7r,P)= consistency measure, 7r= 
possibility, and P= probability. Thus, in order to obtain 
the only probability distribution, we can use a single value 
of a, e.g., 0.9. The analytical solution of a-cut of the 
original problem given in (1) is presented below for three 
measures of consistency. 
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First, if Zadeh's measure is used, (1) becomes as 
follows: 
Max: H= -KE P(a)*ln(P(a)) 
afU 
s.t. E P(a)= 1 
afU (2) 
E P(a)7r(a) >= a 
afU 
The analytical solution of (2) is provided below [Moral, 
1986]. 
If a f [0,1] and u is the root of f(u)= a provided that 
f(u)= p::: 7T(a)* u7 <a>]/ p::: u7 <a>], then the solution can be 
expressed as P(a)= u7 <a>; [E u7 <b>], only if a >= [L 7T<a) J/IUI. 
(3) 
IUI denotes the cardinality of universe of discourse u, 
namely, the number of elements belonging to u. However, if a 
< [E 7r(a)/IUIJ, 
then P(a)= 1/IUI. (4) 
Second, if Dubois and Prade's measure is used, (1) 
becomes the following: 
Max: H= -KL P(a)* ln(P(a) 
s.t. 
afU 
L P(a)= 1 
afU 
II(A) >= P(A) 
(5) 
Moral [1986] showed that II(A) >= P(A) is equivalent to: 
7T (bi) >= P (b1) + • • • + P (bi) I i= 1, • • • In 
where U= {b1, ••• , bn} with 7T(b1) <= ••• <= 7T(bn) (6) 
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He also showed that the following distribution 
satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem (5): 
i=l, •.• ,n 
p(bk)= Min{ [7r(bi)-p(b1)- ••• -p(bk_1) ]/(i-k+l) }, k=2, ... ,n (7) 
i=k, ••• ,n 
In other words, (7) is an optimal solution of the problem 
(5). Kuhn-Tucker conditions produce an optimal solution of 
non-LP problems. For readers interested in Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions, refer to any advanced book in Operations 
Research. 
Finally, if Sugeno's measure is used, (1) becomes the 
following: 
Max; H= -KI: P(a)* ln(P(a)) 
a€U 
s.t. I: P(a)= 1 
a€U 
Ju f(7r) og(P) >= a 
(6) 
Moral showed that denoting U= {a1 , ••• , an} with 7r(a1) >= 
7r ( a2) >= • . . >= 7r ( an) ' 
the condition Ju f (7r) 0 g(p) >= a is equivalent 
to f(p(a 1)+ ••• + p(aicr» >=a, where i(a)= Min {ii g(7r(ai)) >= 
a} (9) 
And if we define h(a)= Inf {t €[0,1] I f(t) >= a}, an 
optimal solution of the problem (8) is as follows: 
if i(a)/IUI >= h(a), then Pcr(a)= l/IUI 
rh (a) / i (a) if k <= i (a) 
L[l-h(a) ]/[ IUI- i(a)] if k > i(a) 
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Some numerical results of the above procedures are shown in 
Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 [Moral, 1986]. 
'ff 
p 
'ff 
Pei a 
0.70 
0.76 
0.85 
1.00 
TABLE 5 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION USING C2 
(=ZADEH'S MEASURE) 
Xl X2 X3 X4 
1 0.9 0.7 0.2 
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.2 
TABLE 6 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION USING C0p 
(=DUBOIS AND PRADE'S MEASURE) 
x, X2 X3 X4 
1 0.9 0.7 0.2 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
0.30 0.28 0.24 0.17 
0.41 0.32 0.20 0.07 
1 0 0 0 
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TABLE 7 
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION USING Cs {=SUGENO'S MEASURE) 
x, X2 X3 X4 
1f 1 0.9 0.7 0.2 
Pa a 
0.76 0.38 0.38 0.12 0.12 
0.85 0.43 0.43 0.07 0.07 
0.95 0.95 0.02 0.02 0.02 
1. 00 1 0 0 0 
These three tables showed that the derived probability 
distribution varies depending on which measure is used 
and/or which value of a is used. 
Similarly, we can derive a possibility distribution 
from the probability distribution using ME. Thus, a 
possibility distribution is the solution of the following 
non-LP problem: 
Maximize H= -K ~ Pos(a)*ln(pos(a)) (10) 
a€U 
s.t. "Pas is consistent with P," where pas= possibility and 
P= probability. 
Any of three probability/possibility consistency 
measures can be substituted into the constraint "Possibility 
is consistent with probability." Since the use of different 
consistency measure leads to the different probability 
distribution. Furthermore, if Zadeh's measure or Sugeno's 
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measure is used, the same value of a should be used to 
maintain the consistency. 
The analytical solutions of problem (10) are to be 
discussed below for three consistency measures. First, 
suppose that Dubois and Prade's measure is used. Equation 
(7) indicates that the use of their consistency measure 
makes it extremely difficult to derive an analytical 
solution of problem (10). This is because the determination 
of ~(bi) 's given p(bi) 's is extremely difficult due to the 
fact that we cannot guarantee that ~(b1 ) <= ... <= ~(bn) is 
satisfied before ~(b;) 's are obtained. This eliminates 
Dubois and Prade's measure from further consideration for 
problem (10). 
Second, suppose Sugeno's measure is used for problem 
(10). Equation (9) holds if ~(a 1 ) >= ~(a2 )>= ... >=~(an). 
This condition of equation (9) cannot be guaranteed to be 
true before ~(a;) •s are determined. Thus, we can also 
conclude that Sugeno's measure is inappropriate for problem 
(10) in the same manner that Dubois and Prade's measure is 
not considered as a potential candidate of consistency 
measure. 
Finally, consider Zadeh's measure. The problem (10) 
becomes the following: Max: H= -KL Pos(a)*ln(Pos(a)) 
a€U 
s.t L Pos(a)*p(a) >=a, a € [0,1] (11) 
a€U 
The application of extension of the Lagrangian method 
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to problem (11), provides the following analytical solution. 
For the readers interested in the extension of Lagrangian 
method, refer to Taha (1982]. If xi= 0.368, i=l, ... ,n 
satisfies the constraint of problem (9), then it is an 
optimum. solution. However, if xi= 0.368, i=l, ... ,n does not 
satisfy the constraint of problem (11), then optimal 
solution is: xi= e**(9pi-1], i=l, ... ,n such that p1* 
(e**(9p1-1) ]+ ••• + Pn* (e**(9pn-1) ]= a. (12) 
A proposed scheme to convert the probability into a 
possibility distribution is presented below, followed by the 
description of a proposed scheme to convert a possibility 
distribution into the probability. Suppose that the given 
probability is P1 • The first step is to express the 
(single-valued) probability as the second-order probability 
distribution. P1 can be expressed as the following second-
order probability distribution: {1/P1 ,0/P2 , ••• ,0/pn}, where 
first and second element of a pair denote the second-order 
probability and first-order probability, respectively. 
The second and final step is to derive a possibility 
distribution from the (second-order) probability 
distribution using a proposed scheme. For instance, we can 
derive the equivalent possibility distribution, {u1/P1 , 
u2/P2 , ••• , unfPn} from the probability distribution 
{l/P1,0/P2 , ••• ,0/Pn}, where ui denotes the membership value. 
The scheme to convert a possibility distribution into 
the probability is discussed below. This conversion scheme 
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is used when the final result obtained from the probability 
theory is compared to that obtained from FST. Suppose the 
final result obtained from FST is {u1/p1+u2/p2+ ... +Ur/Pn}. 
Using a proposed conversion scheme based on ME, the 
(second-order) probability distribution {q1/p1+ 
q2/p2+ ••. qr/Pn} can be derived from { u 1/p1 , u2/p2 , ••• , Ur/Pn} . 
This second-order probability distribution can be converted 
into a single-valued probability, by computing the mean of 
the distribution { q1/p1+ ... +qr/Pn}. Then the mean can be 
used as the probability-equivalent measure. 
The proposed simulation model uses the probability as a 
measure of belief. The scheme to convert the probability 
into a possibility distribution derives a (probability-
equivalent) possibility distribution (or linguistic 
probability). Then we can perform the relevant operations 
on the probabilities and the linguistic probabilities (or 
possibility distributions) . 
Different types of operations are performed on the 
linguistic probabilities depending on whether the linguistic 
probability is treated as a fuzzy set or a fuzzy number. As 
the final results, we have the final output expressed as the 
probability, two possibility distributions for two 
interpretations. Now we can convert two possibility 
distributions into a single-valued probability using the 
proposed scheme. Finally, we can compute mean squared 
error, mean absolute error, normalized mean squared error, 
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and normalized mean absolute error of two interpretations. 
The interpretation with the smaller error is concluded as 
the best interpretation. The flow chart of proposed 
simulation model is shown in Appendix. 
It can be argued that because the proposed schemes 
between a possibility distribution and the probability 
distribution are based on the weak relationships between two 
distributions, the conclusion obtained from this simulation 
model may not be convincing. However, since the same 
conversion schemes are applied to both interpretations, it 
does not seem to affect the results unfairly. 
It is also possible to criticize the use of a proposed 
simulation model, in that the proposition of fuzzy-set-based 
algorithms is not consistent with the use of Wise's 
framework as a basis of a simulation model. The argument 
may be that the fuzzy-set-based algorithms fundamentally 
favors FST over the probability theory, whereas Wise's line 
of reasoning is that the probability theory is all we need 
in uncertainty management in ESs, nothing else. 
Our position in regard to the Bayesian approach and 
non-Bayesian approaches is to accept the probability theory 
as a normative approach, but at the same time, admit that 
the problems with the probability theory, especially the 
second-order probability theory. This can lead to the 
adoption of the non-Bayesian approaches in some 
applications. 
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Analysis of Results 
An example of Bayesian network discussed earlier in 
this chapter is adopted in a simulation model. Its Bayesian 
network is shown below. A node A stands for the identity of 
the last user of the weapon and a node B represents the 
identity of the last holder of the weapon. 
A 
' 
' 
' 
' 8 E I 
I 
I 
c 
A node c denotes the possible readings that may be 
obtained from a fingerprint laboratory and a node E stands 
for an event producing an alibi. We assume that the alibis 
are obtained after the information about a fingerprint is 
obtained. In this experiment, we assume that there are 
three suspects. 
In this experiment, the prior probability distribution 
of a node A can take either (0.8 0.1 0.1) or (0.6 0.2 0.2). 
P(BIA) takes the following three distributions: 
[o. 8 0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1] 0.1 or 
0.8 
[o. 6 0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.6 
0.2 
o. 2] 0.2 or 
0.6 
[o. 4 0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.3 
0. 3] 0.3 
0.4 
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The initial "descendant belief" of node B is {l 1 1), 
but later changed to either {0.8 0.6 0.5) or {0.6 0.8 0.5). 
This "descendant belief" is changed due to the result 
obtained from a fingerprint laboratory. After the alibis 
for three suspects are obtained, a node E is connected to a 
node A. The message sent from a node E to a node A takes 
either {O.l 1.0 1.0) or {0.1 0.1 1.0). 
The valu.es employed in this experiment are determined 
arbitrarily, because our goal is simply to test which 
interpretation of the linguistic probability generates the 
better results between a fuzzy number interpretation and the 
fuzzy set interpretation. Thus, there are thirty-six 
different cases in this experiment. 
As discussed earlier, four measures of error are 
adopted, namely, the average absolute error, average squared 
error, average normalized absolute error, and average 
normalized squared error. In each of thirty-six cases, 
these four measures are computed. Then the averages of 
these four measures are used in determining which 
interpretation performs better. 
The averages of these four measures are computed at a 
node A and node B. That is, we compute the errors between 
the probability obtained from Pearl's algorithm and ·the 
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linguistic probability obtained from the proposed algorithm. 
The results are given below. 
Node A: fuzzy number fuzzy set 
interpretation interpretation 
average absolute 
error 0.1382 0.2366 
average squared 
error 0.0473 0.1162 
normalized average 
absolute error 0.5298 0.2959 
normalized average 
squared error 0.8098 0.5948 
Node B: fuzzy number fuzzy set 
interpretation interpretation 
average absolute 
error 0.0531 0.2176 
average squared 
error 0.0066 0.1031 
normalized average 
absolute error 0.8117 0.2585 
normalized average 
·squared error 0.9590 0.5858 
Note that the normalized error takes 1 for zero error, 
129 
o for the random guessing, and -1 for the worst outcome. 
These results indicate that a fuzzy number interpretation 
performs better than the fuzzy set interpretation. That is, 
-we can conclude that the operations defined on fuzzy numbers 
perform better for the linguistic probability than the 
operations defined on the fuzzy sets. 
In fact, these results support Bonissone and Decker's 
position [1986] that the linguistic probability is treated 
as a fuzzy number. However, it seems that Bonissone and 
Decker's assertion that the linguistic probability is 
treated as a fuzzy number, is not based on any kind of 
theory or experiment. Thus, this experiment provides the 
experimental support for Bonissone and Decker's argument, 
although this experiment does not prove it. Several 
questions can be raised with regard to this experiment. 
The first question is as to whether the result obtained 
from this simple binary tree is strong (or valid) enough to 
conclude that a fuzzy number interpretation performs better 
than the fuzzy set interpretation. Even if the adopted 
Bayesian network looks like a simple binary tree, lots of 
computations are performed until the beliefs at node A and 
node B are determined. Therefore, it can be argued that 
this simple binary tree can generate the valid result. 
The second question is as to whether the result 
obtained from a simple binary tree can be applied to Pearl's 
algorithm for the network structure. As shown earlier, the 
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algorithm performed in the network structure is basically of 
the same nature to that of an algorithm for a tree 
structure. Note that we do not attempt to develop the new 
algorithms for the Bayesian networks, but attempt to resolve 
the problems associated with the adoption of the linguistic 
probability. 
The third question is as to whether just one experiment 
can generate the valid results. That is, it can be argued 
that the additional experiments need to be done by changing 
the size of the vector. For instance, it could be argued 
that if the size of the vector is changed to the even 
number, e.g., 4, we might have the different conclusion. 
Although it is not shown here, some experiment is 
performed for the vector of size 2. Because its results are 
basically identical to that of the vector of size 3, we do 
not test thirty-six cases. Based on the experiments 
performed, we could conclude that the result will be 
identical regardless of the size of the vector. 
The final question can occur as to why we need to use 
the Bayesian network. That is, ·we can employ an experiment 
in which a combination of the addition, multiplication, and 
division is performed on the linguistic probabilities. It 
seems that this simple experiment may also produce the 
meaningful results. 
However, the number of operations performed in the 
binary tree until the final beliefs at node A and node B are 
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determined, is relatively large. Furthermore, we propose 
the procedure to perform a normalization. Thus, the use of 
this simple binary tree enables us to test how well this 
proposed normalization procedure performs. In this regard, 
we can argue that the experiment based on the binary tree is 
more appropriate than the simple experiment in which a 
collection of addition, multiplication, and division are 
performed. 
Linguistic Approximation 
A linguistic approximation is the process of finding a 
label whose meaning is the same or the closest to the 
meaning of an unlabelled fuzzy set generated by the 
computational model. For example, a fuzzy set {0.3/0.2, 
0.4/0.4, 0.5/0.6, 0.8/0.9} could be labelled as "more or 
less true" or "very true." 
Wenstop[1980], Eshragh and Mamdani [1979], Bonissone 
and Decker [1986], and Bonissone [1979] have developed the 
procedures for a linguistic approximation. A proposed 
-
approach is not meant to be an alternative scheme to all 
existing approaches, but is a practical scheme which employs 
the strengths of the existing approaches to a large extent. 
In fact, a proposed approach is primarily built around 
Eshragh and Mamdani's approach and Bonissone's approach. 
The primary characteristics of a proposed approach are 
as follows: 
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(1) It adopts the hedges like Eshragh and Mamdani's approach 
to increase its granularity. 
(2) Like Eshragh and Mamdani's approach, it employs the 
search step performing a perfect match between an unlabelled 
set and each primary subset. If a perfect match exists, 
this step will reduce a search time to a great extent. 
(3) After the primary subsets are combined with the hedges, 
the proposed search procedure consists of two phases, that 
is, prescreening procedure and a procedure to find the best 
label using a modified Bhattacharyya distance. The 
prescreening procedure can cope with the increasing 
complexity of an exhaustive search. This search procedure 
will reduce a search time as the number of primary subsets 
and the hedges increase. 
(4) The parametric representation of primary subset [Beyth-
Marom, 1966] and three term sets [Bonissone and Decker, 
1986], are employed in a proposed approach, where each term 
set consists of a number of the linguistic probabilities. 
(5) As Bonissone [1979] suggested, four features, that is, 
the power, fuzzy entropy, first moment, and skewness are 
employed to represent each term. 
Bonissone and Decker developed three term sets, i.e., 
five element term set, nine element term set and thirteen 
element term set, where each term in a term set is 
represented by the 4-tuple [a,b,a,p]. For the elements in a 
term set, the two measures of dispersion, namely, the 
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interquartile range (c25 - c75 ) and the 80 percent range (C10 -
C90) , were used to define respectively the interval [a, b] 
and [(a-a), (b-#)] of each linguistic probability. The five 
element term set L1 , the nine element term set ~' and the 
thirteen element term set ~ are shown in Table 8, Table 9, 
and Table 10, respectively. 
TABLE 8 
FIVE ELEMENT TERM SET: L1 
impossible (0 0 0 0) 
unlikely (. 01 .25 .01 • 1) 
maybe ( . 4 .6 . 1 . 1) 
likely (. 7 5 .99 . 1 . 01) 
certain (1 1 0 0) 
The characteristics of a proposed approach are discussed 
in detail below. The 4-tuple representation is adopted 
primarily because it is the only representation based on the 
experiment. The three term sets are employed, mainly 
because it is likely to increase the chances that we can get 
the consistent answers from several experts. That 
is , from the users' perspective, it facilitates them to 
choose the appropriate .answer from the terms provided. 
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A proposed approach allows the users to select the term 
set among three term sets in the actual application. The 
main advantage obtained from allowing the users to select a 
term set is given below. These term sets provide the 
different levels of granularity, i.e., the finest level of 
distinction among different quantifications of uncertainty. 
TABLE 9 
NINE ELEMENT TERM SET: Li 
impossible (0 0 0 0) 
extremely_unlikely (. 01 .02 .01 • 05) 
very_low_chance (. 1 .18 .06 . 05) 
small chance (. 22 .36 .05 .06) 
it_may (. 41 .58 .09 .07) 
meaningful_chance (. 63 .80 .05 . 06) 
most_likely (. 78 .92 .06 . 05) 
extremely_likely (. 98 . . 99 .05 • 01) 
certain (1 1 0 0) 
This enables the users to choose a colection of the 
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linguistic probabilities which has an appropriate level of 
granularity for the specific application. 
TABLE 10 
THIRTEEN TERM SET: L:3 
impossible (0 0 0 0) 
extremely_unlikely (. 01 .02 .01 .05) 
not_likely (. 05 .15 .03 .03) 
very_low_chance ( . 1 .18 .06 .05) 
small chance (.22 .36 .05 .06) 
it_may (. 41 .58 .09 .07) 
likely (. 53 .69 .09 .12) 
meaningful_chance (. 63 .80 .05 .06) 
high_chance (. 7 5 .87 .04 .04) 
most_likely (. 78 .92 .06 .05) 
very_high_chance (. 87 .96 .04 .03) 
extremely_likely (. 98 .99 .05 . 01) 
certain (1 1 0 0) 
As Eshragh and Mamdani's approach employs the hedges, 
a proposed approach employs the following hedges: "highly," 
"very," "more or less," and "slightly." The hedges which 
are combined with some of the terms in each term set are 
shown in Table 11, Table 12, and Table 13. 
TABLE 11 
COMBINATION OF THE HEDGES WITH A TERM SET L1 
impossible 
unlikely 
maybe 
likely 
certain 
highly 
* 
* 
very 
* 
* 
more or less slightly 
* * 
* * 
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The selection of hedges is restricted by a number of hedges 
which are well-defined and/or whose definitions are 
consistent among FST researchers. Note that '*' in these 
tables indicates that the corresponding hedge is combined 
with the corresponding term. 
First of all, there are not lots of hedges which are 
well defined. Furthermore, in some cases, the hedges have 
the different definitions among researchers. As the number 
of hedges which are well defined increases, we can employ 
more hedges in this proposed scheme. 
TABLE 12 
COMBINATION OF THE HEDGES WITH A TERM SET L2 
impossible 
extremely_unlikely 
very_low_chance 
small chance 
it_may 
meaningful_chance 
most_likely 
extremely_likely 
certain 
highly 
* 
* 
very more or less slightly 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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The sole purpose of employing the hedges in a proposed 
approach is to increase the level of granularity. When the 
users use the linguistic probability as the input to the 
system, the users will be asked whether they want the 
hedges. Users have the option of choosing some of the 
available hedges or all the available hedges or no hedges at 
all. The default option is not to adopt any hedges. 
Similarly, when the system generates the output, the users 
have the option regarding the use of hedges in the final 
output. The default option is not to use any hedges. 
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TABLE 13 
COMBINATION OF THE HEDGES WITH A TERM SET ~ 
highly very more or less slightly 
impossible 
extremely_unlikely 
not_likely 
very_low_chance 
small chance 
it_may 
likely 
meaningful_chance 
high_chance 
most_likely 
very_high_chance 
extremely_likely 
certain 
* * 
* * 
* * 
* * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Bonissone and Decker [1986] presented a simplified 
approach which adopts only two parameters, the power and 
first moment when these three term sets are used. They did 
not provide clear reasons why only two features are adopted 
in a simplified approach. However, since a term set has the 
small cardinality, i.e., number of terms in a term set is 
small, the use of four parameters does not seem to pose any 
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problem in terms of computational time and storage 
requirements. Thus, the use of four features is adopted in 
a proposed approach. 
Bonissone [1979] who proposed the use of four 
parameters, did not discuss specifically how to compute 
these four parameters. The power and entropy can be 
computed easily from the distribution of the linguistic 
value. However, the computation of the first moment and 
skewness is not straightforward due to the fact that these 
are defined for a random variable which has an associated 
probability distribution. The schemes to compute the first 
moment and skewness are presented below. 
As discussed earlier, we can derive the probability 
distribution from a possibility distribution using ME. The 
proposed approach first derives the probability distribution 
from a possibility distribution and the first moment and 
skewness of the derived probability distribution can be the 
first moment and skewness of the linguistic probability. 
As Eshragh and Mamdani•s approach adopts an exhaustive 
search in the first phase of the search procedure by testing 
a perfect match between the unlabelled set and primary 
subsets and adopts an heuristic search in the second phase 
of search procedure to find the best label, a proposed 
approach adopts the similar strategy. 
In a search procedure, the first step checks a perfect 
match between the unlabelled set and (primary) terms in the 
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term set. If a perfect match is found, a search procedure 
is terminated. Otherwise, the second step is activated. 
This first step can reduce the search time if a perfect 
match exists. The second step consists of two phases, 
namely, prescreening and a search of the best label. 
The prescreening procedure is performed based on the 
weighted Euclidean distance. This phase produces a number 
of terms whose weighted Euclidean distance is within a 
predetermined tolerance level. The main goal of this 
prescreening procedure is to reduce the search space in an 
exhaustive search. The second phase, namely, a search of 
the best label selects the best label by computing a 
modified Bhattacharyya distance of each term selected at the 
first phase. Thus, the main search routine is built around 
a combination of Eshragh and Mamdani's approach, and 
Bonissone's approach. 
Unless specified otherwise by the users, a single-
valued probability corresponding to a term in the term set 
is provided to the users for reference. This can be 
achieved by converting the membership function of a term to 
the probability distribution, followed by the computation of 
the mean of the second-order probability distribution. 
A proposed approach to a linguistic approximation can 
be summarized as follows: 
Step 1 (input): 
Users are asked to choose one term set among three term 
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sets. Also users are asked to indicate whether they want 
the hedges in the input and output. If the users do not 
respond with regard to the input, a default option, namely, 
no use of the hedges is adopted. Similarly, if the users do 
not respond in regard to the output, also a default option, 
that is, no use of the hedges is adopted. Furthermore, the 
users are allowed to choose the hedges they want. 
Unless otherwise specified, a single-valued probability 
corresponding to each term is provided to the users. The 
users also can assign the weights to four features. If not 
specified, the default option, namely, equal weights to four 
features are used. 
Step 2 (search and evaluation procedure): 
Phase 1: If the unlabelled set shows the characteristics 
similar to those of terms in the term set, then it will be 
tested against the appropriate terms in a term set for a 
perfect match. If a perfect match occurs, then the search 
is terminated. Otherwise, proceed to phase 2. 
Phase 2: First, prescreen all the (linguistic) terms using a 
weighted Euclidean distance. Users can input the desired 
tolerance level, if they choose to. Otherwise, the default 
value is. used. Finally, select the best label for the 
unlabelled set using a modified Bhattacharyya distance. 
Step 3 (output): 
Generate the output including the best label ~nd its 
corresponding single-valued probability if needed. 
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The flow chart of a proposed approach to a linguistic 
approximation is shown in Appendix. 
Implementation 
Two main computer programs are written for this 
dissertation. The first program is the program performing a 
simulation used for selecting the best one from a fuzzy set 
interpretation of the linguistic probability and a fuzzy 
number interpretation of the linguistic probability. 
The second program is the implementation of a proposed 
linguistic approximation scheme. This program can be added 
to any system based on FST as a module performing a 
linguistic approximation. These programs are coded in the 
programming language c. Specifically, the programming is 
done in the Turbo C system that is one of the popular c 
system for personal computer users. 
Turbo C system can be used to develop both MS-DOS and 
UNIX compatible software. The fact it can be used to 
develop both MS-DOS and UNIX compatible software implies 
that when we upload c programs developed in Turbo c system 
into VAX system of the mainframe, the programs can be run 
correctly under VAX system with little modifications, i.e., 
·c is highly portable. This is in contrast with other 
programming languages, e.g., PL/I which is different 
depending on whether IBM system or VAX system is used. 
Thus, PL/I is said to have less compatibility than c. The 
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flow charts of these two programs are shown in Appendix. A 
computer program determining a eigenvector corresponding to 
the maximum eigenvalue of a given matrix is listed in 
Appendix. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are two major objectives of this study. The 
first objective is to determine the operations appropriate 
for the linguistic probabilities. It is achieved using a 
proposed simulation model. The second objective is to 
develop an approach to a linguistic approximation. This 
proposed approach is implemented in C language. 
The conclusion obtained from the simulation model is 
that the operations defined on the fuzzy numbers perform 
better for the linguistic probabilities than the operations 
defined on the fuzzy sets. This conclusion is consistent 
with the position taken by Bonissone and Decker [1986]. The 
contribution made by this simulation model is to provide the 
experimental results to support the argument that the 
linguistic probability is treated as a fuzzy number. 
A proposed scheme to a linguistic approximation employs 
the four-feature representation, namely, first-moment, 
entropy, skewness, and power. It also employs the four 
parameter representation for each term, namely, [a,b,a,fi]. 
It seems that under this four-parameter representation, the 
skewness is not a good feature, because its variance is very 
small. On the other hand, first-moment, entropy, and power 
seem to be good features representing a term. 
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The contributions made by this dissertation can be 
summarized as follows: 
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(1) It provides a basis to consolidate the argument that the 
linguistic probability is treated as a fuzzy number through 
the experiment. 
(2) The proposed simulation model can be employed in other 
problems of FST, especially if it is not possible to develop 
a set of theorems to prove that one approach performs better 
than the other. Although the results obtained from this 
simulation model do not prove anything, it at least provides 
some justifications to favor one approach over the other. 
(3) Although a proposed approach to a linguistic 
approximation is not a totally new approach, it could be a 
very comprehensive approach in the sense that it attempts to 
adopt the strengths of Eshragh and Mamdani's approach and 
Bonissone's approach. 
Several problems associated with this research are 
identified. 
(1) In the proposed scheme to a linguistic approximation, we 
need to derive a possibility distribution from the 
probability distribution, and vice versa. In these 
conversions, we need to solve the nonlinear equations. The 
determination of the analytical solutions is very time 
consuming, thus can become the bottleneck in terms of 
computational time. 
(2) The proposed scheme to a linguistic approximation 
employs the hedges. As discussed earlier, the sole reason 
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to employ the hedges is to increase the granularity of a 
term set. It is ideal to select the hedges so that the 
terms are evenly spread out in the closed interval [O,l]. 
However, the lack of the hedges in which the definitions are 
consistent or they are well-defined, restricts the selection 
of the hedges. 
In the future, further research needs to be done on the 
following problems: 
(1) In a fuzzy number, more research needs to be done in 
regard to the flattening. Note that the flattening needs to 
be applied before the operations on fuzzy numbers are 
performed. 
(2) More research needs to be done in the hedges. That is, 
more hedges need to be defined and also their definitions 
need to be consistent among the researchers. 
(3) The development of the analytical solutions in deriving 
a possibility distribution from the probability 
distribution, and vice versa, is necessary to make a 
proposed scheme to a linguistic approximation more 
practical. This is due to the long computational time in 
determining the analytical solutions. 
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APPENDIX 
FLOW CHARTS OF THE PROGRAMS 
Two programs are to be implemented, namely, simulation 
program and a program performing a linguistic approximation, 
in this dissertation. A simulation program is used to 
select a set of operations appropriate for the linguistic 
probabilities. The flow chart of a simulation program is 
presented first, followed by the description of the flow 
chart of a program plrforming a linguistic approximation. 
Because the actual coding is generally straightforward, 
the listings of the entire programs are not shown here. 
However, a program to determine the weights of four 
parameters is listed here, because it seems worth being 
listed. A program to determine the weights of four 
parameters is adopted in a program performing a linguistic 
approximation. 
The flow Chart of the simulation model is shown in 
Figure 15 and the flow chart for a program performing a 
linguistic approxima~ion is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15. Flow Charts of a Simulation Model 
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/********************************************************* 
* This routine determine the eigenvector corresponding to* 
* a maximum eigenvalue of a given (square) matrix. * 
*********************************************************/ 
{ 
} 
float b[4],r[4],e[4]; /* e: elements of eigenvector*/ 
float a[4][4]; /*a given matrix*/ 
float sum,eigenvalue; 
int i,j,cnt=O, found=O; 
int n=4; /* size of matrix */ 
for (i=O; i < n; i++) 
b[i]= 1.0/ ((float) n); 
for (i=O; i < n; i++) { 
sum=O.O; 
} 
for (j=O; j < n; j++) 
sum+= b[j]* a[i][j]; 
r[i]= sum; 
sum=O.O; 
for (i=O; i < n; i++) 
sum+= r[i]; 
for (i=O; i < n; i++) 
e[i]= r[i]/ sum; 
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